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PORNOGRAPHY AS POLLUTION
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pornography is often compared to pollution.  The comparison
appeared early in the development of obscenity law in nineteenth cen-
tury Britain.1  It was especially common during the 1960s and 1970s,
when Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)2 and the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”)3 while the Supreme Court and legal scholars
struggled with governmental efforts to regulate pornography.4  One
judge enjoined the showing of a pornographic movie at a drive-in the-
ater because “[i]f the owner of land can be prohibited from polluting
the community with noxious smoke and unpleasant odors, we con-
ceive of no reason why he cannot be prohibited from polluting the
neighborhood with visual material harmful to children.”5  Robert
Bork wrote, “[P]ornography is increasingly seen as a problem of pollu-
tion of the moral and aesthetic atmosphere precisely analogous to
smoke pollution.”6  In the twenty-first century, climate change is a
global environmental problem while pornography has become a
global problem thanks to the Internet.  And, pollution imagery sur-
rounds both climate change and Internet pornography.  Two years
before the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that climate
Copyright  2011 by John Copeland Nagle.
* John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School.  I am thankful for the oppor-
tunity to present earlier versions of this Article at the UCLA Law School and at the South-
western University School of Law in Chongqing, China.  Amy Barrett, Eric Claeys, Rick
Garnett, Abner Greene, and Andy Koppelman provided invaluable comments on an ear-
lier draft.
1. See Matthew Benjamin, Possessing Pollution, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 733,
739 (2007) (referring to mid-nineteenth century descriptions of pornography as
“‘poison’” and “‘contamination and pollution’”).
2. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)).
3. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)).
4. See Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695, 700
(2007) (noting that “the Court fought bitterly about obscenity doctrine” between 1957 and
1973).
5. Cactus Corp. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 480 P.2d 375, 379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
6. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
29 (1971).
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change is a pollution problem,7 the Court’s invalidation of a federal
Internet pornography law prompted one newspaper to editorialize
that the Court’s decisions were to blame for “why the Internet is so
polluted with pornography.”8
Legal scholars say the law has failed to control Internet pornogra-
phy.  It is hard to argue with them.  Amy Adler observes, “In the esca-
lating war against pornography, pornography has already won.”9  But,
she adds, “[T]he government is not going to lay down its arms.”10
Meanwhile, Andrew Koppelman documents the persistence of objec-
tions to pornography, especially claims of moral harm.11  For Adler
and Koppelman, the efforts to employ the law against pornography
have been unsuccessful because of the First Amendment’s protection
of free speech, and relatedly because the government is ill-suited to
regulate moral harms or pornography generally.12
Neither Adler nor Koppelman, though, contends that the wide-
spread prominence of pornography on the Internet is a social good.13
Opponents of pornography maintain passionate convictions about
how sexually explicit materials harm both those who are exposed to
them and the broader cultural environment.  Viewers of pornography
may generally hold less fervent beliefs, but champions of free speech
and of a free Internet object to antipornography regulations with
strong convictions of their own.  The challenge is how to address the
widespread concern about pornography while recognizing the limits
of government regulation.
This Article will respond to the law’s failures by framing pornog-
raphy as a pollution problem.  Pornography has long been seen as a
First Amendment problem—unavoidably and rightly so.  But, pornog-
raphy is not just a First Amendment problem.  It may also be ex-
7. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (“The harms associated with
climate change are serious and well recognized.”).
8. Editorial, High Court Backs Pornographers, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, July 12,
2004, at B7.  The editorial was responding to Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), which
affirmed a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Child Online Protection
Act (“COPA”).
9. Adler, supra note 4, at 695. R
10. Id. at 710.
11. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635,
1639–43 (2005) [hereinafter Koppelman, Moral Harm].
12. See Adler, supra note 4, at 703; Koppelman, Moral Harm, supra note 11, at 1639 R
(describing the “inevitable clumsiness” of First Amendment jurisprudence related to
pornography).
13. See Adler, supra note 4, at 695 (claiming to take no “side in the porn wars”); Koppel- R
man, Moral Harm, supra note 11, at 1679 (arguing that pornography can cause moral R
harm).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 3 22-JUN-11 14:53
2011] PORNOGRAPHY AS POLLUTION 941
amined as a problem of pollution.  Casual references to pornography
as pollution are common,14 but they have rarely been accompanied by
a careful consideration of what this pollution image means.15  Ameri-
can environmental law has considerable experience battling different
kinds of pollution problems—sometimes successfully, sometimes not.
Generally, environmental law seeks to (1) prevent some pollution from
occurring at all, (2) control other pollution so it does not enter the
environment, (3) facilitate the separation of pollution that does reach
the environment from those it could harm, and (4) tolerate the pres-
ence of some pollution.16  The experience with these four approaches
may suggest strategies for addressing pollution that can help respond
to concerns about pornography, especially Internet pornography.
American environmental law also rebuts the familiar argument that
pollution controls necessarily come at the cost of economic growth or
other social goods.17  The experience of other nations—especially
14. See, e.g., Iraq Reconstruction and Stability Operations: The Way Forward Hearing Before the
House Armed Servs. Comm., 108th Cong. 73 (2003) (statement of Karl Zinsmeister, American
Enterprise Institute) (worrying about “the pollutive effect” of pornography in Islamic
countries); 145 CONG. REC. H542 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Pitts) (com-
plaining that a federal district judge’s invalidation of COPA enabled children to “easily
access these pornographic sites and pollute their minds with sexually explicit material” (em-
phasis added)); 142 CONG. REC. E931 (daily ed. May 29, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hoke)
(complaining that the price of pornography shown on cable television “is the pollution of
our culture”); Janice Rogers Brown, The Once and Future First Amendment, in 2007–2008
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 9, 13 (referring to “conservatives who would treat pornogra-
phy like smoke pollution”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 794 (2001) (characterizing Internet pornography as
pollution because its harms “are much like the harm to the neighbors of a cement mill”);
Seth F. Kreimer, Response, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 1010 (2002) (describing the “burning moral desire that no member
of my community be polluted by pornography”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Un-
free Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 952 n.17 (1995) (noting that some people would punish
pornographers “for emitting a kind of moral pollution”); Editorial, Indecent Exposure, BOS.
GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1997, at A22 (“Pornography pollutes the Internet like smog on a sunny
day.”).
15. Two writers have developed the argument that pornography is like environmental
pollution. See Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 17–19
(2000); H. Patricia Hynes, Pornography and Pollution: An Environmental Analogy, in PORNOG-
RAPHY: WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 384, 384–97 (Catherine Itzin ed., 1992).
Neither Hynes nor George, however, considers the implications of or the objections to this
approach.
16. See John Copeland Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism, 40 ENVTL. L. 53, 67 (2010) [herein-
after Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism] (noting prevention, control, separation, and tolerance
responses to pollution); John Copeland Nagle, The Four Responses to Pollution (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
17. President Obama’s statement is representative:
Throughout our history, there’s been a tension between those who’ve sought
to conserve our natural resources for the benefit of future generations, and those
who have sought to profit from these resources.  But I’m here to tell you this is a
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China—offers insight into far different responses to claims of pornog-
raphy as pollution.18
Part II of this Article will explain how pornography is like pollu-
tion, and how it is not.  Part III will consider the obstacles to relying
on regulation to combat pornography.  Part IV will turn to the diffi-
culty with simply instructing Internet users to tolerate pornography.
Part V will show how viewing pornography as a problem of pollution
may assist in devising new ways of responding to the widespread con-
cerns about Internet pornography.  Environmental law suggests that
victims of pollution should not be burdened with avoiding it, and that
filtering and zoning strategies can play a role in helping people avoid
exposure to the effects that pornography has on the Internet
environment.
II. THE POLLUTION ANALOGY
There are many kinds of environmental pollution, but most air,
water, and other environmental pollution share several characteristics.
Generally, pollution refers to the introduction of material into an en-
vironment where it harms those who are exposed to it or where it
results in indirect harms to others in the environment.19  Compari-
sons of pornography to pollution presume that graphic sexual mate-
rial serves as the offending pollutant.20  This material is introduced
into the culture or online by parties ranging from curious or preda-
tory individuals to organizations comprising the multibillion dollar
online pornography industry.21  The most sexually explicit, and the
false choice.  With smart, sustainable policies, we can grow our economy today
and preserve the environment for ourselves, our children, and our grandchil-
dren.  That is what we must do.
Barack H. Obama, Remarks on the 160th Anniversary of the Department of the Interior
(Mar. 3, 2009).  Supporters of increased domestic energy production voice the same argu-
ment about the presumed trade-off between increased domestic energy production and
environmental protection. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H3239 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (state-
ment of Rep. Gibbons) (citing the “false choice between environmental protection and
energy production”).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 95–128. R
19. See, e.g., David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Con-
tested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79, 107 (2004).
20. These themes are developed by H. Patricia Hynes, an environmental attorney who
explains that pornography—like environmental pollution—spreads throughout the envi-
ronment, harms those who did not consent to its release, is hazardous even in modest
amounts, and is defended as beneficial by the industries that produce it. See Hynes, supra
note 15, at 387–94.  “Like polluted ecosystems,” Hynes adds, “women in sexist societies R
have low occupational diversity and few resources.” Id. at 384.
21. Id. at 388–89; Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 51.
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most violent, pornography is produced by entities specifically commit-
ted to this venture.  Consumers then further disseminate the materials
to other consumers, a process that became dramatically easier with
the advent of digital file transfer.  Once in the environment, pornog-
raphy results in a variety of harms to those who choose to be exposed
to it, to families in which parents seek to shield their children from
such materials, and to those who are affected by the cultural influ-
ences of pornography.22
Despite these similarities, there are also differences between In-
ternet pornography and most types of environmental pollution,
though these differences are often exaggerated.  First, much exposure
to pornography results from the intentional actions of people who
seek out such images.  Few people are similarly attracted to toxic
fumes (though environmental historians tell stories of communities
that once boasted of their smoky atmospheres).23  The desire to be
exposed to the pollutant complicates the response to pornography
available online.  Some Internet pornography, however, is viewed un-
wittingly via unsolicited e-mails, the entry of an incorrect web address,
the use of search terms with double connotations, purposeful efforts
by pornographers to mimic seemingly innocent web addresses, and
clicking on links of unknown provenance.  These exposures to In-
ternet pornography are more analogous to traditional understandings
of pollution and thus potentially addressed in a like manner.
A second possible distinction involves the nature of the affected
environment.24  There is no agreement concerning the ideal, unpol-
luted baseline cultural environment.  Opponents of Internet pornog-
raphy seek a “clean” online environment, though there are few (if
any) individuals who believe that the Internet should be devoid of any
references to or depictions of sexuality.  It is equally difficult to iden-
22. See, e.g., A Nasty Global Problem, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/society/2001/nov/29/childrensservices1 (detailing the use of the Internet to
disseminate child pornography).
23. See PETER THORSHEIM, INVENTING POLLUTION: COAL, SMOKE, AND CULTURE IN BRIT-
AIN SINCE 1800, at 55 (2006) (quoting Claude Monet’s statement that “without the fog
London would not be a beautiful city”).
24. The environmental aspect of pornography is referenced in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), in which the Court stated that pornography implicates “the
interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment.”  413 U.S.
at 58; see also JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE: 500 YEARS OF WESTERN CUL-
TURAL LIFE, 1500 TO THE PRESENT 789 (2000) (“The atmosphere of sexuality likewise gave
the illusion of real life.  And the word atmosphere suggests only the enveloping presence: its
force was invasive.  The air was thick with pictures of half-naked bodies in seductive
poses.”).
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tify what constitutes “clean” air or “clean” water.25  Besides H2O, water
contains sodium, calcium, chlorine, magnesium, potassium, copper,
lead, and zinc.26  The Earth’s atmosphere consists of nitrogen, oxy-
gen, argon, neon, helium, methane, krypton, hydrogen, nitrous ox-
ide, xenon, water, carbon dioxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and
nitrogen dioxide.27  Natural processes constantly change the composi-
tion of air and water.28  Yet we are able to refer to “polluted” air and
water even though we cannot identify precisely what constitutes
“clean” air and water.29
A third, and perhaps the most common, distinction between por-
nography and pollution is easily rebutted.  It is often asserted—or just
assumed—that “pornography” cannot be defined.30  As Justice Stewart
put it, “I know it when I see it” is the only way to explain what is ob-
scene.31  Justice Stewart wrote this phrase to explain why he agreed to
overturn the obscenity conviction of Nico Jacobellis, the manager of a
Cleveland Heights theater that showed the 1958 movie Les Amants,
which featured a bored housewife who has an affair with an archaeol-
ogy student.32  A number of Cleveland residents employed pollution
imagery to voice their disgust with the movie.33  The Supreme Court
of Ohio upheld the obscenity conviction with an ode to the ability of
the popular majority to insist on their vision of a desirable moral com-
munity.34  Justice Stewart lamented, in defining pornography, the U.S.
25. For a discussion of the baseline aspect of pollution claims, see John Copeland Na-
gle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 50–55 (2009) [hereinafter Nagle, Idea of
Pollution].
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 50–55.
30. Cf. James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1993)
(“Except for those who profit by selling pictures of vaginas, the Supreme Court’s various
definitions of obscenity have been unsuccessful, at least in practice.”).
31. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 195–96 (majority opinion).  For details of the movie’s plot, see infra note 37. R
33. See Sven Dubie, Obscene History in the Heights: The Case of Nico Jacobellis and Les
Amants, http://www.chhistory.org/FeatureStories.php?Story=ObsceneHistory (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011) (quoting contemporary accounts of residents complaining about “‘foreign
film garbage’” and the “‘filth spewing forth from a tarnished screen’”).
34. State v. Jacobellis, 179 N.E.2d 777, 779–80 (Ohio 1962), rev’d, 378 U.S. 184.  The
court’s opinion was written by Judge Radcliff of the state appeals court, who after acknowl-
edging his temporary status on the supreme court, proclaimed:
History is replete with examples of nations that lost positions of eminence in the
world and whose citizens lost their freedom due to decay of their moral fiber
resulting in degeneracy and depravity.  Legislative bodies must continue to pass
laws which attempt to protect the morality of the people from themselves and
from their own weaknesses.
Id. at 778–79.
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Supreme Court was “trying to define what may be indefinable.”35  He
asserted his own conclusion that the First Amendment only permitted
the criminal regulation of “hard-core pornography.”36  He then
added,
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of mate-
rial I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.37
This “I know it when I see it” test has become the paradigmatic
example of a standardless standard.  It has been quoted by courts and
legal commentators to describe the difficulty in defining terms such as
attorney work product, breaches of fiduciary duties, “clothes” gov-
erned by labor law, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s rights, and
impermissible “excessive” damages in tort litigation.38  The attention
to Justice Stewart’s phrase is rarely flattering, with the phrase often
quoted as evidence of the failure to achieve a principled definition of
the conduct that the law seeks to encourage or to forbid.39
35. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).  For more about the facts of Jacobellis, see id. at 185–87.  Jus-
tice Brennan explained,
The Lovers involves a woman bored with her life and marriage who abandons her
husband and family for a young archaeologist with whom she has suddenly fallen
in love.  There is an explicit love scene in the last reel of the film, and the State’s
objections are based almost entirely on that scene.  The film was favorably re-
viewed in a number of national publications, although disparaged in others, and
was rated by at least two critics of national stature among the best films of the year
in which it was produced.
Id. at 195–96.  Justice Goldberg in concurrence added that “the love scene deemed objec-
tionable is so fragmentary and fleeting that only a censor’s alert would make an audience
conscious that something ‘questionable’ is being portrayed.” Id. at 197–98 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).  Justice Goldberg also found the advertising for the movie more offensive
than the movie itself. Id.  The theater responded by showing the film again three days after
the Court’s decision, advertising, “ ‘Thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court you can now see
[the movie] and, in accordance with your constitutional rights, enjoy your freedom of
opinion and expression!’”  Dubie, supra note 33. R
38. The frequent judicial references to Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” re-
mark include United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 34 n.12 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting) (work product), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010); Brieger v. Tellabs, Inc., 629 F.
Supp. 2d 848, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (breach of fiduciary duty); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global,
Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (employee’s “clothes”), aff’d, 614 F.3d 427
(7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 933 (2011); Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F. Supp. 2d
914, 916 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (deliberate indifference); Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield
Operations, Inc., 215 P.3d 791, 797 n.1 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (excessive damages).
39. See, e.g., Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d at 34 n.12 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“This test is
reminiscent of Justice Stewart’s famously unhelpful test . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Nonetheless, sometimes courts are willing to say what is pornog-
raphy and what is not.  Now-Justice Sotomayor illustrated how pornog-
raphy may be defined during her tenure on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.40  The case involved Christopher
Farrell, who pled guilty to sodomizing four teenage boys and whose
subsequent parole conditions stated that he “will not own or possess
any pornographic material.”41  Farrell’s parole office later found a
number of problematic publications in Farrell’s apartment, including
the book Scum: True Homosexual Experiences.42  The prosecutors re-
voked Farrell’s parole, and after serving his full sentence, Farrell
brought a Section 1983 civil rights action seeking damages for his al-
leged unconstitutional re-imprisonment.43  Judge Sotomayor was thus
confronted with the question of whether a parole prohibition on por-
nography was unconstitutionally vague under the First Amendment.
She noted the difficulty in defining pornography, but she “doubt[ed]
that many people would agree with [Farrell’s] position that pornogra-
phy includes only sexual materials so ‘extreme’ as to depict children
or bestiality.”44  She concluded that the book qualified as pornogra-
phy “within any reasonable understanding of the term.”45  It is thus
possible for the law to decree that a particular publication is
pornographic.
It is also possible for the law to produce a workable definition of
pornography that can be used to distinguish between what is pornog-
raphy and what is not.  The identification problem is common to eve-
rything that is described as pollution.  The late anthropologist Mary
Douglas characterized pollution as matter out of place, which invites
an often-contested judgment about the boundaries that keep things
where they belong.46  The manner in which environmental law re-
solves the identification problem is instructive.  Environmental law
employs three different solutions to the problem of defining pollu-
tion: (1) it treats everything that is added to the environment as pollu-
40. Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2006).
41. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 477.
43. Id. at 476.
44. Id. at 491.
45. Id. at 490.  No senators asked Judge Sotomayor about Farrell during her confirma-
tion hearings to serve on the Supreme Court, though the case did attract the attention of
some bloggers and pundits. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, More Evidence? Sotomayor on Gay
Porn. . . ., LEONARD LINK (June 6, 2009), http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonard
link/2009/06/more-evidence-sotomayor-on-gay-porn.html (admitting to “some problems”
with Judge Sotomayor’s reasoning but doubting that the case displayed any anti-gay bias).
46. See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION
AND TABOO 193–94 (1966).
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tion (the comprehensive solution); (2) it relies upon detailed lists of
pollutants or polluters (the listing solution); or (3) it relies upon the
effects of an alleged pollutant (the effects solution).47  The breadth of
environmental law’s understanding of “pollution” is demonstrated by
the CAA’s application to carbon dioxide, water, and other greenhouse
gases that occur naturally in the atmosphere and that are essential for
life, as well as by insurance litigation finding that innumerable com-
mon substances qualify as pollutants outside the scope of liability
coverage.48
Each of these solutions could be extended to pornography.  In-
deed, the listing and effects solutions have already been employed in
defining Internet pornography.  The Child Online Protection Act
(“COPA”) embodies the listing solution when it refers to sexual acts,
sexual contact, and “exhibition[s] of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast.”49  The effects solution is seen in the Children’s In-
ternet Protection Act’s (“CIPA”) reference “to visual depictions that
are . . . harmful to minors.”50  Only the comprehensive solution is
missing from Internet pornography laws, presumably because no one
believes that everything contained on the Internet is pornographic.
The objections to these definitions of Internet pornography sound in
claims of vagueness or overbreadth, which is again like the similar ob-
jections that regulated parties offer to definitions of environmental
pollution.51
The claims that pornography is ambiguous are really about some-
thing else: the fear of suppressing too much speech.  Few people care
if the CWA defines water pollution in a manner that encompasses
some things that they do not regard as pollution, but laws that regu-
late speech that is not seen as pornographic provoke free speech—
and thus First Amendment—objections.  It is useful to remember that
pornography is no more difficult to define than air or water pollution,
and it is the consequences of an imprecise definition that generate
the real concern.
Fourth, pornography and pollution also differ in the harms asso-
ciated with them, but these harms are not as different as one may
47. See Nagle, Idea of Pollution, supra note 25, at 29–32 (describing and providing exam- R
ples of each solution).
48. See Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism, supra note 16, 68–73 (describing the treatment of R
greenhouse gases as pollutants within the meaning of the CAA); Nagle, Idea of Pollution,
supra note 25, at 33–37 (summarizing the insurance litigation). R
49. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(B) (2006).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A) (2006).
51. See, e.g., Nagle, Idea of Pollution, supra note 25, at 33–37 (describing that environ- R
mental law definitions are “vague or overbroad”).
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suppose.  The most contested aspect of the pornography debate con-
cerns the effects of exposure to sexually explicit materials once they
enter the cultural environment.  Justice Souter, for example, opined
that “as a general matter pornography lacks the harm to justify
prohibiting it.”52  Moral harm is the concern of much traditional op-
position to pornography.  Robert George, for example, emphasizes
the moral harm of pornography.53  According to George, “[W]here
pornography flourishes, as it does in our own culture, it erodes impor-
tant shared public understandings of sexuality and sexual morality on
which the health of the institutions of marriage and family life in any
culture vitally depend.”54  He also contends that it is “unjust to subject
people to powerful temptations to do things that are harmful to them,
morally or otherwise, and whether or not they are cognizant of the
harm.”55  Of course, not everyone accepts the harms that George de-
scribes, but Koppelman’s work “concludes that moral harm is a mean-
ingful concept, and that some literature can produce it,” though he
also deduces that legal regulation is ill-suited for preventing moral
harm.56  Besides moral harms, much feminist literature argues that
women suffer harms resulting from their mistreatment by men who
are exposed to environments polluted by pornography.57  The Na-
tional Research Council’s study of Internet pornography found it
“worth mentioning impacts on society as a whole,” observing “that in-
teractions and behavior that result in reduced respect for human life
and human dignity can damage the common good and be negative
for society.”58
Claims of injury and causation for environmental pollution are
contested just like claims of injury and causation respecting pornogra-
52. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 310 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. George, supra note 15, at 18. R
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id.
56. Koppelman, Moral Harm, supra note 11, at 1639. R
57. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1985) (“Pornography sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harass-
ment, prostitution, and child sexual abuse; it thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, and
legitimizes them.”); see also Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm:
Why Miller Should Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611, 637–42 (2008) (summariz-
ing the social science research on the effects of pornography).
58. COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMMS. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRA-
PHY, AND THE INTERNET 171–72 (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002) [hereinaf-
ter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT].  Also, in enacting COPA, Congress found that
“the physical and psychological well-being of minors” were threatened by Internet pornog-
raphy.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402, 112 Stat. 2681-736, 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 231 note (2006)).
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phy.59  Albert Lin’s careful survey of the role of harm in environmen-
tal law concluded that “harm can be surprisingly ambiguous and
contested,” and that the famed “harm principle often disguises inevi-
table choices about values.”60  Environmental law views pollution as
harmful for several distinct reasons: pollution causes human illnesses;
it interferes with the ability to use the affected environment; it injures
the environment itself and the wildlife and plants that live in it; it is
aesthetically displeasing; and it is immoral.61  Some environmental
harms are famously elusive.  For example, wind power may avoid the
harms of climate change, but individuals who live near wind farms
accuse the structures of despoiling the aesthetics of their prized
views.62  Climate change itself may result in flooding, drought, warm-
ing temperatures in some places and cooling temperatures in others,
and a series of changes to the pre-existing environment.63  None of
these harms result from direct exposure to greenhouse gases; they
may result indirectly from the way in which greenhouse gases change
the larger environment.64  In addition, these changes are only harms
to the extent that they interfere with the expectations of those who
have relied upon certain climatic patterns.65  Yet, despite the changes,
some individuals and communities prefer the changed environment
that climate change could produce—just like some people benefit
from the sexually explicit materials that others dismiss as
pornography.66
59. Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897,
900.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 902–09.
62. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 218 P.3d 400, 405–06 (Kan. 2009)
(upholding a county moratorium on large commercial wind farms located in scenic Flint
Hills because “[t]hey would be incompatible with the rural, agricultural, and scenic charac-
ter of the County”).
63. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 7–22 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) (describing
various regional climate changes and the various effects those changes have had on the
local resources).
64. Id. at 9.  The report noted that (1) “the observed increase in the globally averaged
temperature . . . is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse
gas concentrations,” and (2) “significant change in many physical and biological sys-
tems . . .are consistent with the direction of change expected as a response to warming.”
Id.
65. Id. at 12 (“Where extreme weather events become more intense and/or more fre-
quent, the economic and social costs of those events will increase . . . .”).
66. See id. at 11 (noting that crop productivity may increase slightly in some areas and
decrease in others); id. at 12 (citing the “mixed effects” of climate change as including a
decrease of malaria in Africa); id. (concluding that “[t]he balance of positive and negative
health impacts will vary from one location to another, and will alter over time as tempera-
tures continue to rise”).
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The fifth possible distinction suggests that the harms of pornog-
raphy are somehow different in kind or are mediated differently than
the harms of environmental pollution.  This is untrue to the extent
that environmental pollution itself yields the same kinds of harms as
pornography, and in those circumstances—such as climate change—
the harms result indirectly from the introduction of a pollutant into
an environment.  This overlap accounts for only a modest number of
the harms of pornography and environmental pollution.  The
broader claim about the balance of pornography’s harms is doubtful
as well.  Frederick Schauer concludes that the harms of free speech
are quite similar to the arguments about liberty in general, and that
“arguments about the liberty of speech become less discontinuous
from arguments about liberty in general.”67  To say that pornogra-
phy—or anything else—is pollution is to make a claim about its unde-
sirability in certain places.  “Pollution” always has a negative
connotation, but what constitutes “pollution” depends upon societal
or individual judgments about particular substances or things.  We
make judgments about chemicals in the water, carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, pornography on the Internet, money in political cam-
paigns, and racist conduct in the workplace.  We may decide to pre-
vent, control, separate, or tolerate.  As I explain next, government
regulation of pornography is deeply problematic, but so too is simply
telling people to tolerate the ill effects they associate with pornogra-
phy.  The problems with each extreme approach suggest that environ-
mental law’s other responses to pollution may be more suitable for
pornography.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH REGULATION
The distribution of pornography was once a federal offense.68
Not anymore.  Federal law prohibits “obscene” materials.69  It does
not regulate pornography that is not obscene nor do many state
laws.70  Similarly, much environmental pollution remains uncon-
67. Federick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635, 635
(1993).
68. See Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (prohibiting the use of the mail to
send “obscene, lewd, or lascivious” matter).
69. The federal statute still refers to “lewd, lascivious, or filthy” materials, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1465 (2006), but is now interpreted to apply materials that satisfy the Court’s constitu-
tional obscenity standard, see Adler, supra note 4, at 705 n.63 (providing examples of recent R
obscenity prosecutions).
70. The most notable exception is child pornography, which is prohibited by federal
statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251, though for reasons that focus upon the harm to the children
exploited in producing the pornography rather than the harm to those who later view that
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trolled.  But, three reasons for the paucity of antipornography laws—
constitutional constraints, commitment to free speech regardless of
constitutional commands, and ineffectiveness of regulation—explain
why most environmental pollution controls are not an effective tool
for addressing pornography.
A. Regulation Is Unconstitutional
The First Amendment’s application to pornography is surpris-
ingly nuanced.  Pornography did not receive any constitutional pro-
tection until half a century ago.  Some scholars insist that
pornography is not speech at all and thus not entitled to the protec-
tion of the First Amendment.71  But, the Supreme Court held other-
wise in Roth v. United States72 in 1957, when it ruled that “obscene”
materials could be regulated consistently with the First Amendment
while the balance of pornographic material was constitutionally pro-
tected.73  The Court struggled to distinguish prohibited obscenity
from protected pornography until Miller v. California74 in 1973, when
the Court announced a three-part test for obscenity: (1) “the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) “the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law”; and (3) “the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”75
Even after Miller, the First Amendment has applied differently to
pornography that occurs in different environments.  The Court has
accepted a significant degree of regulation regarding the placement
of businesses featuring pornographic materials.76  Regulating the pos-
pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (“It is evident beyond
the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psycholog-
ical well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” (quoting Global Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982))).  Even so, those who possess child pornography may be
civilly liable to pay restitution to the children who appeared in pornographic movies. See,
e.g., United States v. Yang, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54925 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2010) (ordering
a defendant convicted of child pornography to pay $2,851.20 in restitution to a child por-
nography victim).
71. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Is Pornography “Speech”?, 14 LEGAL THEORY 71
(2008) (reviewing the debate about the status of pornography as speech within the mean-
ing of the First Amendment).
72. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
73. Id. at 491–92.
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
76. See infra text accompanying note 274. R
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session of pornography is only acceptable and permissible when the
material is judged obscene according to the local community’s stan-
dards.77  Materials that qualify as “obscene” under the Court’s Miller
test may be regulated—even criminalized—by the government.78  Ad-
ler worries that “obscenity law has begun to stage a dramatic and sur-
prising comeback.”79  Therefore, communities have a limited say in
deciding what pornographic material is allowed in their local
environments.
The Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept regulation of
the Internet environment.  The Internet is often characterized as an
especially fruitful forum for the exercise of free speech, as witnessed
by the Court’s repeated invalidation of laws designed to regulate
speech on the Internet.  In 1997, the Court struck down provisions of
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) that prohibited the trans-
mission of obscene or indecent messages to minors.80  In 2002, the
Court rejected a facial challenge to COPA, which contained a similar
prohibition but added a defense for those who restrict access to such
material.81  In 2004, however, the Court held that COPA was unconsti-
tutional because the federal government failed to demonstrate that
there were not any less restrictive alternatives than the measures con-
tained in COPA.82  The trilogy of decisions prompted two leading
scholars to ask if there is “any regulation that Congress might constitu-
tionally impose upon Internet transmission of sexually explicit mate-
rial.”83  It is this context—a legal pass for most Internet pornography
but harsh prosecution for the few materials that are judged to be ob-
scene—that troubles opponents of Internet pornography and champi-
ons of free speech.84
77. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
78. Id. at 27–28.
79. Adler, supra note 4, at 697. R
80. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (holding that the CDA’s “indecent
transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions abridge the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment).
81. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585–86 (2002) (enjoining the government
from enforcing COPA pending further action in the lower courts because “COPA’s reli-
ance on community standards to identify ‘material that is harmful to minors’ does not by
itself render the statute substantially overbroad for the purpose of the First Amendment”).
82. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (upholding the decision to enjoin
provisions of COPA).
83. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 163 (3d ed.
2007).
84. The mixed constitutional treatment of pornography becomes even more confusing
when it is compared to the constitutional status of other kinds of speech that are said to
pollute societal environments.  One such type of speech, violent entertainment, is broadly
protected by the First Amendment but has been linked to specific instances of violence
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B. Regulation Is Harmful
Constitutionality aside, any effort to control pornography con-
fronts claims of censorship.  Consider the Attorney General’s Commis-
sion on Pornography, established by Attorney General William French
Smith but typically associated with his successor, Attorney General Ed-
win Meese.85  The Commission’s 1986 report never described pornog-
raphy as pollution.  Instead, the idea of pollution was invoked by the
American Civil Liberties Union, which titled its attack on the Commis-
sion’s report “Polluting the Censorship Debate.”86  From this comes
the criticism that pornography regulation interferes with the market-
place of ideas in which all types of speech compete for the allegiance
of interested readers and listeners.87  More ominously, Internet activ-
ists worry that governments who say they are only interested in regu-
lating pornography are actually eager to stifle political dissent: “The
and general cultural acceptance of violence. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick,
244 F.3d 572, 579–80 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.) (remanding with instructions to enter a pre-
liminary injunction against the enforcement of an Indianapolis ordinance restricting the
access of minors to video game machines), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001); JAMES T. HAM-
ILTON, CHANNELING VIOLENCE: THE ECONOMIC MARKET FOR VIOLENT TELEVISION PROGRAM-
MING 20–30 (1998) (analyzing violent entertainment as a pollution problem).  Another
type of speech that receives mixed treatment is campaign money, which has been accused
of polluting political and legislative processes, and whose regulation depends upon a ques-
tionable distinction between contributions and spending. See generally John Copeland Na-
gle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 293 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH DREW,
THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY (1999)) (suggesting
campaign money “pollutes the system”).  A third type of speech that receives little constitu-
tional protection are words that result in hazardous workplaces polluted by discrimination,
which subject an employer to liability under federal civil rights laws with little constitu-
tional scrutiny. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to “a work environment ‘heavily polluted with discrimi-
nation,’ because of the deleterious effects of such an atmosphere on an employee’s well-
being.” (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972))); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (same); Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (same); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does
“Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997) (discussing the
parameters of “hostile work environment” harassment law).  I hope to explore the constitu-
tional basis for these distinctions in the future, but for now it suffices to observe that the
First Amendment prohibits much government regulation of pornography, especially on
the Internet.
85. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM’N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 3 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL
COMM’N REPORT] (explaining that Attorney General William French Smith established the
Commission and that Attorney General Edwin Messe later publicly announced the Com-
mission’s formation).
86. See ACLU, POLLUTING THE CENSORSHIP DEBATE: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986).
87. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 639–40 (1982)
(asserting that one’s choice to view pornography evokes the same principles of autonomy
as selecting one’s political leaders).
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power to regulate pornography has been persistently abused, not only
to suppress great works of literature, but also to suppress frank discus-
sions of sexual ethics and to deprive women of information about
birth control.”88
The regulation of environmental pollution faces similar criti-
cisms.  Concerns about economic and social impacts confront envi-
ronmental legislation.  The 2009 proposed law to regulate greenhouse
gases89 that contribute to climate change offers the most recent illus-
tration.  Members of Congress who opposed the American Clean En-
ergy and Security Act of 2009 said it would “raise your energy taxes,
dictate your lifestyle and devastate your jobs.”90  Much First Amend-
ment scholarship asserts that the regulation of speech is fundamen-
tally more dangerous than the regulation of economic markets, but
this distinction does not persuade everyone.  As one environmental
attorney asked, “If they can limit ‘free enterprise’ without fundamen-
tal damage to a free market economy, then why can’t they limit ‘free
speech’ without fundamental damage to First Amendment rights?”91
Perhaps they can.92  But, the dangers of regulation are real and for
many they are more dangerous than pornography itself.93
C. Regulation Is Ineffective
Environmental law seeks to prevent much pollution from hap-
pening and to control the release of pollutants that are produced.  A
88. Andrew Koppelman, Why Phyllis Schlafly Is Right (but Wrong) About Pornography, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 105, 123 (2008) [hereinafter Koppelman, Phyllis Schlafly].
89. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
90. 155 CONG. REC. H8691 (daily ed. July 23, 2009) (statement of Rep. McCotter); see,
e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H9254 (daily ed. July 31, 2009) (statement of Rep. LaTourette) (wor-
rying that the bill will regulate Christmas lights); 155 CONG. REC. H7460 (daily ed. June 26,
2009) (statement of Rep. Graves) (asserting that the bill’s “actual goal is to direct more
taxpayer dollars to the government coffers” and that it will result in “an average tax in-
crease of $3100 for families; additional regulatory and administrative costs on small busi-
nesses; higher energy expenses for all—especially those in rural areas; and significant job
loss”); 155 CONG. REC. H7396 (daily ed. June 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Foxx) (contend-
ing that “[t]he bill will result in an enormous loss of jobs that would ensue when U.S.
industries are unable to absorb the cost of the national energy tax and other provisions”
and that “the tax would outsource millions of manufacturing jobs to countries such as
China and India”).
91. Hynes, supra note 15, at 388. R
92. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14, at 815 (suggesting “that courts have over- R
stated the extent of the pornography statutes’ chill on Internet commerce”).
93. See, e.g., Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, New Concerns
About Internet and Reality Shows: Support for Tougher Indecency Measures, but Worries
About Government Intrusiveness 1 (Apr. 19, 2005) (reporting that forty-eight percent of
those surveyed were more concerned about undue government restrictions on the Internet
while forty-one percent were more concerned about harmful content).
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prevention and control strategy applied to pornography would seek to
eliminate pornography from the Internet.  But, it is doubtful that gov-
ernment regulation could eliminate pornography from the Internet,
even if such regulations were enacted and enforceable.94
Imagine that neither First Amendment nor general free speech
principles prohibited government regulation of pornography.  Actu-
ally, we need not imagine this because China provides an illustration.
China has waged periodic campaigns against “spiritual pollution”—
primarily western influences—since the 1960s.95  China turned its at-
tention to environmental pollution during the 1990s as numerous
Chinese cities were listed as among the worst polluted in the world.96
Now, with the advent of the Internet, China is engaged in an unprece-
dented—though not especially successful—effort to control Internet
pornography.
The Chinese government is trying to cleanse the Internet of the
pollution of pornography.97  The Supreme People’s Court of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China issued a press release in January of 2010 enti-
tled “Online Distributors of Pornographic Contents Will Be Harshly
Punished by Law” that boasted that 1,580 individuals were successfully
prosecuted for spreading pornography during the first ten months of
2009.98  The government took credit for shutting down or blocking
more than 15,000 pornographic websites that contained 1.5 million
94. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 58, at 112–14 (observing that R
the Internet is a global medium subject to different nations’ sensitivities toward explicit
materials and explaining how effective regulation of pornography on the Internet hinges
on a number of factors, including training and education).
95. See generally ORVILLE SCHELL, TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS: CHINA IN THE EIGHTIES
170–75 (1984) (describing Chinese campaigns against “spiritual pollution”).
96. See ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHAL-
LENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 28 (2004) (remarking that part of what sets China apart from
other countries at the same level of economic development is the scale of its environmen-
tal degradation).
97. For instances of Chinese officials describing pornography as pollution, see China
Desires a PG Web, EWEEK, Feb. 22, 2008 (reporting that the State Administration of Radio,
Film and Television stated that pornographic websites had “seriously polluted the online
environment”); China’s Zhou Yongkang Urges Crackdown on Pornographic Web Sites, BRITISH
BROADCASTING COMPANY, July 25, 2004 (quoting a Chinese Communist Party official who
asserted that Internet pornography “polluted the social environment”); Jonathan Fenby,
Google Blazes a Trail with China Rift, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 13, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jan/13/google-china-politics-censor-
ship (indicating that China’s “senior official in charge of media has talked of the country
acting ‘proactively’ to set up its own system to prevent the spread of moral pollution from
abroad”).
98. Press Release, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China,
Online Distributors of Pornographic Contents Will Be Harshly Punished by Law, Jan. 13,
2010, http://english.cqyzfy.gov.cn/view.php?id=10302505201035250520105125052010582
505201064250520.
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items of “lewd content” during 2009.99  The government receives aid
in its efforts from an army of individuals who receive payments for
tipping off government officials about pornographic websites.100
Additionally, China has developed and employs one of the largest
and most sophisticated Internet filtering systems in the world.101
Dubbed “‘the great firewall of China,’” the system “uses a variety of
overlapping techniques for blocking content containing a wide range
of material considered politically or socially sensitive by the Chinese
government.”102  It is manned by tens of thousands of censors who
have blocked an even larger number of websites containing porno-
graphic content.103  These efforts are supplemented by an extraordi-
narily complex legal regime that is enforced by more than a dozen
governmental entities.104  Several regulations prohibit the use of the
Internet to access pornography, including a 2009 rule that targets
99. China Blocks 15,000 Porn Websites, XINHUANET (Jan. 12, 2010, 8:53:04 PM), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/12/content_12798331.htm.
100. See China Rewards 215 People for Tip-Offs on Porn Websites, XINHUANET (Jan. 18, 2010,
8:44:59 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-01/18/c_13141392.
htm (reporting that the government paid 215 whistleblowers between $146 and $1,146
each for providing 90,000 tip-offs about pornographic websites during a six-week period).
101. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA 1 (2009), available at http://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_2009.pdf (describing China’s Internet
filtering system).
102. ROBERT FARIS ET AL., OPENNET INITIATIVE, CHINA’S GREEN DAM: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL ENCROACHING ON THE HOME PC 12 (2009), available at http://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/GreenDam_bulletin.pdf; see also Shawn Healy, The
Great Firewall of China, 71 SOC. EDUC. 158, 158 (2007) (claiming that nowhere is the Com-
munist Party’s control over political freedom more apparent than “on the Information
Superhighway”).
103. See China Begins Month-Long Crackdown on Web Porn, XINHUANET (Jan. 6, 2009,
12:45:17 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/06/content_10608944.htm
(quoting a Chinese government official who said that “‘[t]he government will continue to
expose, punish or even shut down those infamous websites that refuse to correct their
wrongdoing. . . .  Immediate action is needed to purify the [I]nternet environment.’”);
China Closes 1,600 Internet Cafes in Six Months, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 1, 2004 (report-
ing that China shut down 1,600 Internet cafes and imposed 12 million dollars in fines in
order to address “‘the online cultural market’”); China Closes 44,000 Pornographic Websites in
2007, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 23, 2008 (reporting that the Chinese government ar-
rested 868 people and closed down 44,000 domestic websites and homepages); Chinese
Police Forces Crack Down on Porn Websites Using Foreign Proxy Servers, XINHUANET (July 12,
2009, 10:38:18 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/12/content_11697859.
htm (reporting that “[m]ore than 1,000 websites have been blocked for distributing porn
and other lewd materials since the government launched the Internet clean-up campaign
at the beginning of this year”); Facts and Figures: China’s Efforts in Fighting Porn, Illegal Publi-
cations in 2010, XINHUANET (Dec. 30, 2010, 11:43:32 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english2010/china/2010-12/30/c_13671264.htm (“China has shut down more than
60,000 porn websites since launching a crackdown in December 2009.”).
104. See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 7–14 (describing China’s com- R
plex legal and regulatory frameworks for filtering online content).
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“sexually suggestive or provocative content that leads to sexual
thoughts.”105  The Chinese government imposes a variety of sanctions
for violation of its rules, including criminal liability, fines, licensing
and registration requirements, the closure of websites, loss of jobs,
and instructions for self-monitoring.106
China pushed its antipornography efforts further in 2009.  In
May, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”)
notified computer manufacturers that any new computers sold in
China needed to contain filtering software known “Green Dam Youth
Escort.”107  The purpose of the software is to block access to porno-
graphic websites.108  It seeks to accomplish this goal by preventing a
computer from opening websites that are contained on a constantly
updated blacklist.109  Thus the “Green” Dam would prevent any por-
nography from polluting “a green and healthy cyberspace.”110
The Green Dam mandate prompted a backlash in China, the
United States, and elsewhere.  Technical experts criticized the
software as poorly designed for its intended purpose.111  The company
that developed Green Dam faced accusations of copyright violations
105. Id. at 10 (quoting a March 30, 2009 notice “detailing twenty-one unusually specific
and wide-ranging additional content categories that online video providers should edit or
delete,” including “distortions of Chinese culture and history; disparaging depictions of
revolutionary leaders, heroes, police, army or judiciary; depictions of torture; mocking de-
pictions of catastrophe, including major natural disasters; excessively frightening images
and sounds effects,” as well as “sexually suggestive or provocative content that leads to
sexual thoughts”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See FARIS ET AL., supra note 102, at 14 (describing China’s legal control over the R
Internet).
107. See id. at 4 (explaining that the purported intent of the Green Dam Youth Escort
software announced in the May notice was to prevent harmful information from reaching
youth and to promote “a healthy and harmonious Internet environment”); OPENNET INITI-
ATIVE, supra note 101, at 21–22 (describing the May 2009 Green Dam Youth Escort software R
as much more powerful than China’s pre-existing, centralized filtering system).
108. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 21–22 (reporting that the purported R
intent of the Green Dam Youth Escort software is to block pornography, but also observing
that an early technical assessment of the software found it was ineffective at preventing
access to pornography although it did unpredictably block political and religious content).
109. See FARIS ET AL., supra note 102, at 6–7 (explaining that the Green Dam Youth R
Escort is a Windows client application that inserts “hooks deeply into the operating system”
that will block content based on whether it calls for certain behaviors: “success,” “network
reset,” “browser kill triggered by content,” or “browser kill triggered by location entry”);
SCOTT WOLCHOK ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE GREEN DAM CENSORWARE SYSTEM (rev. 2.41 June
11, 2009), available at http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/gd/ (providing details
about the operation of the Green Dam Youth Escort and describing how it blacklists politi-
cal and adult content).
110. Chinese Ministry Spokesman Answers Reporters’ Questions on Internet Filter, BBC WORLD-
WIDE MONITORING, July 1, 2009 (quoting an MIIT spokesman).
111. See FARIS ET AL., supra note 102, at 2 (noting that “a combination of poor implemen- R
tation and opaque design makes it very difficult for even expert users to understand what
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 20 22-JUN-11 14:53
958 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:939
and death threats from Chinese Internet users.112  The U.S. Trade
Representative and Commerce Departments threatened to challenge
the legality of the Green Dam mandate under international trade trea-
ties.113  More broadly, civil liberties groups worried that the Chinese
government would use Green Dam to regulate political and religious
discussions, not just pornography.114
This time the Chinese government backed off.  It announced a
delay in the Green Dam mandate one day before it was to become
effective in July, and then the government withdrew the requirement
altogether in August.115  It was all a “misunderstanding,” insisted Chi-
nese officials.116  The episode prompted some observers to suggest
that the Chinese government was finally becoming sensitive to domes-
tic Internet users and foreign complaints.117  But, Green Dam re-
mained mandatory in schools and Internet cafes, and the rest of the
Great Firewall of China remains in place.118  A U.S. State Department
official agreed that “to try and prevent minors from being exposed to
pornography” is “applaudable.”119
China initiated a second dispute regarding Internet pornography
in 2009 with Google China.120  In June, the MIIT and the Chinese
Internet Illegal Information Reporting Centre accused Google China
the system is doing by default, let alone understand the impact and scope of auto-updates
and configuration changes”).
112. See Dammed If You Do; China’s Internet Censors, ECONOMIST (U.S.), June 27, 2009 (re-
porting that Green Dam Youth Escort has caused an uproar and sparked Internet venting,
repeated attacks on the software’s developers, 1,000 harassing calls, and death threats).
113. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Secretary Gary Locke
and USTR Ron Kirk Call on China to Revoke Mandatory Internet Filtering Software (June
24, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/june/secretary-
gary-locke-and-ustr-ron-kirk-call-china-rev (describing a joint letter by U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Gary Locke and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk expressing concerns about
the flawed Green Dam Youth Escort software and calling into question the compliance of
China’s MIIT and Ministry of Commerce with World Trade Organization rules).
114. See FARIS ET AL., supra note 102, at 1 (calling Green Dam Youth Escort a new and R
powerful control mechanism that blocks political and religious content).
115. See Michael Wines, China Scales Back Software Filter Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009,
http:www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/world/asia/14censor.html.
116. Id. (quoting the head of the MIIT) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Editorial, China’s Great Firewall; The Green Dam Episode Suggests That the West Has Some
Influence in Preserving Internet Freedom, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2009 at A12 (noting that China
backed off of its Internet censorship software after opposition from the Chinese people
and foreign companies).
118. See id.
119. Daily Press Briefing, Ian Kelly, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 22, 2009), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jun/125229.htm.
120. Minnie Chan, Beijing Singles Out Google in Attack on Pornography; Internet Giant’s Links
“Severely Harmed” China’s Youth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 19, 2009, at 6.
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of facilitating the dissemination of pornography.121  “Google China
has not conducted the oversight required according to China’s laws
and regulations,” the agencies claimed, “and a large volume of foreign
[I]internet pornographic information has entered our borders
through this website.”122  Google quickly agreed to “fix any
problems.”123  In January 2010, though, Google threatened to aban-
don the Chinese market in part because of the Chinese government’s
attempts to “limit free speech on the web.”124  This time the U.S. Gov-
ernment criticized China’s Internet censorship, with Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton championing “the freedom to connect—the idea that
governments should not prevent people from connecting to the
[I]internet, to websites, or to each other.”125  China’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs responded, “China’s [I]internet is open” and, somewhat
paradoxically, added that the government “supervises [the] [I]nternet
according to law” and consistent with the nation’s “own national con-
ditions and cultural traditions.”126
The Google China dispute began with concerns about pornogra-
phy and morphed into a broader debate about Internet freedom.
One fact was lost during the controversy: Pornography is ubiquitous in
China despite the government’s efforts.  Half of China’s Internet users
have visited pornographic websites, more than the global average of
forty-one percent.127  That is fifty percent of the over 450 million In-
ternet users in China—the largest population of Internet users in the
world.128  Apparently, China’s restrictive antipornography regulations
have not worked.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting the China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Centre) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
123. Yan Hao, Google Pledges to Comb Out Porn Results in China, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(June 20, 2009) (quoting a Google statement).
124. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010,
3:00 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html (official
statement by Google’s chief legal officer).  The immediate cause for Google’s threat to
leave China was the hacking of the Google e-mail accounts of Chinese human rights activ-
ists. Id.
125. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan.
21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
126. Ma Zhaoxu, Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China, Remarks on China-related Speech by U.S. Secretary of State on “Internet Freedom”
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t653351.htm.
127. Press Release, Symantec, Parents, Get a Clue!: Norton Online Living Report
Reveals What Your Cyber-Savvy Children Know That You Don’t (Feb. 13, 2008), http://
investor.symantec.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=89422&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1107653&highlight.
128. 1st LD China’s Online Population Rises To 450 Mln: Official, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(Dec. 30, 2010, 1:25 AM).  There were 298 million Internet users in China as of 2008.
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IV. THE PROBLEM WITH TOLERANCE
Toleration is the central message of most scholarly writing about
pornography and about free speech generally.  Perhaps the best indi-
cation that free speech is all about tolerance appears in Lee Bollin-
ger’s book The Tolerant Society.129  Bollinger champions the value of
tolerance as the defining characteristic of the American devotion to
the protection of free speech, even demonstrably harmful speech.130
“Tolerance,” he explains, refers to “a social capacity to control feelings
evoked by a host of social encounters.”131  Bollinger identifies the
principle undergirding our commitment to free speech as “the choice
to exercise extraordinary self-restraint toward injurious behavior as a
means of symbolically demonstrating a capacity for self-control toward
feelings that necessarily must play a role throughout social interac-
tion, but which also have a tendency to get out of hand.”132  Toler-
ance, in other words, is the acceptance of some harms because
intolerance portends still more dire results.  But, Bollinger is surpris-
ingly equivocal both about the values of tolerance and about the uni-
queness of speech’s claim to tolerance.  He insists that “[t]here are
times when tolerance constitutes moral weakness and is itself properly
to be condemned, just as there are times when responding ‘intoler-
antly’ is a sign of admirable moral strength.”133  Further, Bollinger
proclaims that “the most favorable attribute of all of the term is that
we regularly use it to describe our reactions to nonspeech as well as
speech behavior.”134  That said, much of Bollinger’s book is devoted
to identifying why toleration of speech is such a virtue, as opposed to
intolerance of speech or tolerance of other activities.135  According to
Bollinger, speech can be harmful but is generally less harmful than
other actions, so toleration of speech’s harms is an appropriate appli-
CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR., STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVEL-
OPMENT IN CHINA 3 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/
3/23/153540.pdf.
129. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (discussing the link between the concept of tolerance and free
speech).
130. See generally id. at 9–10.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id. at 142–43.
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id. at 10.
135. See generally id. at 3.
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cation of tolerance.136  In Bollinger’s final analysis, tolerance of harm-
ful speech is an ongoing American experiment.137
Toleration plays a surprisingly common role in the law’s response
to environmental pollution.  Generally, as former EPA official E. Don-
ald Elliott explains, “[S]etting standards defining the levels of various
pollutants that we are willing to tolerate has been the basic method
that we use for regulating pollution in environmental law.”138  Con-
sider the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) that lie
at the core of the Federal CAA.139  The Supreme Court has explained
that the EPA establishes these standards based upon the “the maxi-
mum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health can
tolerate,” with a margin for error to protect health.140  Toleration even
appears in the CAA’s response to the most hazardous air pollutants:
the permitted “toxicity is based on an estimated maximum exposure
to a pollutant that can be tolerated by a human exposed continuously
for seventy years without having any adverse health effects.”141  The
water quality standards that operate as the backup regulatory scheme
under the Federal CWA display a similar tolerance of some water pol-
lution.142  States establish total maximum daily loads based upon the
amount of pollution a given body of water “can tolerate while still meet-
ing water quality goals.”143  So while environmental law does have a
stated preference for preventing pollution, the law’s actual regulatory
regimes tolerate much pollution.  Specifically, environmental law
shows that the presence of pollutants in the environment is tolerated
up to the point at which those pollutants cause unacceptable harms.
Writing about pornography reveals a similar approach.  We
should “tolerate the tolerable,” according to the 1986 report prepared
by the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (a document
not generally regarded as championing an expansive view of free
136. Id. at 59.
137. See id. at 142 (describing the American response to free speech issues as an
“evolved . . . approach with no single, overarching rule”).
138. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 4
(1992).
139. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462–63 (2001) (explaining the re-
quirements of the CAA related to NAAQS).
140. Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
141. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Randy Lowell, Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229, 273 (2001) (emphasis added).
142. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263, 300–01 (2000) (describing the Total Maximum Daily Load program require-
ments regarding water quality).
143. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
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speech).144  But what is tolerable?  Environmental law says that we tol-
erate pollution that is harmless, but we need not tolerate pollution
that is harmful.  The process is not quite so simple because of the
imprecise ability to measure harms and because different people suf-
fer harm from different levels of pollution.  The harms of pornogra-
phy are even more contested, as social scientists debate the effect of
pornography on those who are exposed to it and on the broader cul-
ture and as the very nature of injuries, such as moral harm, is subject
to debate as well.145
Toleration presents special challenges on the Internet, where the
same images are available to all types of communities or even sent
unsolicited to individuals with contrasting desires.  Criticizing COPA,
Justice Stevens asserted “that the Government may not penalize speak-
ers for making available to the general World Wide Web audience that
which the least tolerant communities in America deem unfit for their
children’s consumption.”146  We prefer an online environment that is
free of most regulation, even if the cost of that freedom is an environ-
ment polluted by Internet pornography.  That is the lesson the Court
sent as it twice blocked the enforcement of laws Congress enacted to
protect children from Internet pornography.147  China, by contrast,
would make a different choice.148  Most Chinese citizens are willing to
tolerate an online environment that is regulated by the govern-
ment.149  According to a March 2008 Pew Research Center study,
eighty percent of Chinese citizens believe that Internet pornography
should be controlled, with almost eighty-five percent of respondents
favoring government control.150  The Pew study noted that many Chi-
nese worry about “a bad online atmosphere.”151
Internet pornography presents a special challenge because some
communities place a special value on free speech and the availability
144. ATTORNEY GENERAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 85, at 73. R
145. See supra text accompanying notes 49–58. R
146. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) (allowing a preliminary injunction
against COPA to remain in effect); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (affirming the
district court’s judgment to grant a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
CDA).
148. See Deborah Fallows, Few in China Complain About Internet Controls, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Mar. 27, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/776/china-internet (noting that
“most Chinese say they approve of internet control and management, especially when it
comes from their government”).
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing GUO LIANG, RESEARCH CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCIS.,
SURVEYING INTERNET USAGE AND IMPACT IN FIVE CHINESE CITIES (Nov. 2007)).
151. Id.
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of sexually explicit materials while others are more concerned about
the harms associated with pornography, but we all share the same
global Internet.  The courts disagree about whether to judge Internet
pornography according to the standard of a particular community or
according to the nation as a whole.152  Climate change presents an
analogous problem in which a polluter in one location affects every-
one throughout the world.  Such singular environments suggest that
society must choose between toleration and regulation.  But environ-
mental law has experience with addressing pollution that some regard
as a serious harm, even if the rest of society questions whether this
harm is serious or even exists.  The law may tolerate pollution, but this
does not mean individuals who are exposed to this pollution must tol-
erate it as well.
V. BETWEEN REGULATION AND TOLERANCE
If Internet pornography may be usefully compared to pollution,
but if direct governmental regulation of Internet pornography violates
the First Amendment, then how must we respond to pollution in the
absence of legal regulation?  This is not as strange a question as it may
first seem.  Many efforts to combat environmental pollution must pro-
ceed without the preferred legal tools, either because they are unavail-
able or because they are not adequately enforced.  Those who are
concerned about climate change are grasping to find a federal law—
any law—that can be employed to regulate climate change in the
United States.153  Similarly, there are no laws that effectively control
Internet pornography.  The government struggles to address the
harms associated with pornography, but private individuals and orga-
nizations are entitled to decide for themselves what constitutes harm-
ful pollution.
Thus, Internet pornography is like pollution that the law cannot
prohibit.  Experience with environmental policy teaches that pollu-
152. Compare United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying a
local community standard in an online obscenity prosecution), and United States v. Harb,
No. 2:07-CR-426TS, 2009 WL 499467 (D. Utah Feb. 27, 2009) (applying the Miller v. Califor-
nia, “contemporary community standard” to deny a motion to dismiss an indictment of
federal obscenity statutes), with United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir.
2009) (applying a national standard).
153. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (Clean Air Act); Ctr. for Biologi-
cal Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008)
(National Environmental Policy Act); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species
Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2008) (Endangered
Species Act).  The House approved sweeping climate change legislation, see American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), but the Senate
declined to act on similar legislation.
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tion may be attacked by (1) norms that evolve from educational cam-
paigns resulting in voluntary actions, (2) advances in technology that
eliminate the production of pollution or that prevent its release into
and spread throughout the environment, or (3) avoidance strategies
that facilitate the separation of the pollution from those who would be
harmed by it, perhaps by using the law to facilitate such separation.
A. Social Norms, Education, and Voluntary Actions
Once pollution is identified, the polluter may simply stop pollut-
ing.  Indeed, most pollution would soon disappear if polluters
stopped polluting.  This sounds simplistic, but in many instances it
really is that simple.  Sometimes polluters will stop polluting even if
the law does not require them to do so.  Or if the law prohibits pollu-
tion, the limited ability to enforce the law makes voluntary compliance
essential.  As Thomas McGarity explains, “Because there will never be
a large enough federal environmental police force to ensure that each
of the millions of commuters in large urban areas complies with the
law, a large degree of voluntary compliance is necessary for the suc-
cessful implementation of any program of mobile source air pollution
controls.”154  Far from being a luxury, voluntary pollution controls will
be the only pollution controls in these circumstances.  Yet many pol-
luters are not willing to stop polluting.  Voluntary decisions play an
invaluable role in reducing pollution, but the response to pornogra-
phy must recognize that no type of pollution has ever ended because
of the voluntary choices of the polluters.
Environmental scholars promote norm entrepreneurs who seek
to create a culture in which pollution becomes unacceptable.  Some
studies suggest that controlling environmental pollution through indi-
vidual actions is difficult because “social norms are less likely to de-
velop within large groups.”155  Michael Vandenbergh’s research,
however, is more hopeful of the cultivation of antipollution norms.
Vandenbergh focuses on personal norms (“obligations that are en-
forced through an internalized sense of duty to act and guilt or re-
lated emotions for failure to act”) rather than on social norms
(“informal obligations that are enforced through social sanctions or
rewards”).156  He cites evidence that generalized personal norms of
environmental protection already exist, and he encourages the law to
154. Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in Imple-
menting a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1619 (1996).
155. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (2001).
156. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activa-
tion Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (2005).
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“provide the information necessary to induce individuals to form new
beliefs about the mean and aggregate effects of individual behavior.”157
Many programs designed to encourage voluntary decisions to re-
duce environmental pollution demonstrate the power of antipollution
norms.  The EPA asserts that “[v]oluntary partnership programs play
an important role in achieving environmental results like improving
air quality, lowering greenhouse gases, and reducing solid waste.”158
EPA’s 33/50 program helped companies reduce their releases of toxic
chemicals by millions of pounds.159  Bell Atlantic reduced its waste
production by more than 2.9 million pounds and saved more than six
million dollars through EPA’s WasteWise program.160  The Galveston
Bay Estuary Program and the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission “developed one of the largest voluntary prevention pro-
grams in the country” to reduce water pollution from businesses situ-
ated along the Houston Ship Channel.161  The publication of
information that documents polluters changes behavior as well, as evi-
denced by the response of the chemical industry to the establishment
of the Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”).162  Such programs and other
decisions to voluntarily reduce pollution have yielded numerous suc-
cess stories.
Air pollution illustrates the promise and limits of voluntary pollu-
tion control.  Then-Governor of Texas George W. Bush championed
voluntary actions against air pollution (in part because the Federal
CAA exempted many of the most polluting facilities in the state), but
one scholar described Bush’s voluntary program as “a spectacular fail-
ure.”163  Also, consider the ease with which air pollution from cars can
be reduced.  Manufacturers can produce zero emission vehicles that,
while not cutting emissions actually to zero, yield substantial reduc-
157. Id. at 1106.
158. See, e.g., Heat Island Effect: Where You Live, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/heatis-
land.nsf/webpages/HIRI_Initiatives.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2011) (cataloguing state
and local initiatives designed to “cool communities while saving energy and improving air
quality”).
159. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, EPA, EPA-745-R-99-004, 33/50 PRO-
GRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1–2 (Mar. 1999).
160. SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA, EPA 530-N-99-003, WASTEWISE UPDATE:
THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS—CALCULATION WASTE REDUCTION 5 (July 1999).
161. 146 CONG. REC. H2623 (daily ed. May 8, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bentsen) (prais-
ing the Galveston program).
162. See Vandenbergh, supra note 156, at 1139–46 (“The TRI data . . . appear to have R
induced firms to reduce toxic releases.”).
163. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Federal Government as a Useful Enemy: Perspectives on the
Bush Energy/Environmental Agenda from the Texas Oilfields, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43
(2001).
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tions in pollution.164  Less dramatically, but still very effectively, manu-
facturers can produce cars that use less gas and thus emit less
pollution.  Consumers (including individuals, corporations, and gov-
ernmental procurement officers) can then choose to buy cars that
pollute less.  Consumers can also do the “[t]hree easy things” the EPA
lists on its website: “avoid unnecessary driving,” “maintain your car
properly,” and drive your car “wisely.”165  But, of course, most consum-
ers do no such thing.  Instead, they drive what they want, where they
want, and how they want.  One poll indicated that Californians blame
other people’s cars for the serious threat of air pollution: fifty-eight
percent of the people consider air pollution a “serious health threat,”
but only forty-four percent are concerned that their own cars polluted
too much; just four percent of those surveyed view pollution as the
most important factor in buying a new car.166
Pornography reveals a similar dynamic.  Koppelman asserts that
“moral criticism of pornography is an urgent necessity.”167
Vandenbergh’s research suggests that such criticism could establish
personal norms “that are enforced through an internalized sense of
duty to act” once the law “provide[s] the information necessary to in-
duce individuals to form new beliefs about the mean and aggregate ef-
fects of individual behavior.”168  Likewise, several of the leading
reports on responses to Internet pornography champion voluntary ac-
tions.  The Commission on Child Online Protection, established by
Congress in COPA, concluded that “voluntary approaches provide
powerful technologies for families.”169  Parental education programs,
the creation of acceptable use programs, and public information re-
sources play a prominent role in strategies to minimize the existence
164. See Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Program, CAL. EPA, http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/
zevprog/zevprog.htm (last updated Feb. 23, 2011) (“In order to meet California’s health
based air quality standards and greenhouse gas emission reduction goals, the cars we drive
and the fuel we use must be transformed away from petroleum.”).
165. OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, EPA 420-F-93-002, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR:
WHAT YOU CAN DO TO REDUCE POLLUTION (Aug. 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oms/consumer/18-youdo.pdf.
166. See Californians Hate Air Pollution, Love Cars, Says Poll, YUBANET.COM (July 12, 2003,
8:08 AM), http://yubanet.com/california/Californians_hate_air_pollution_love_cars_says
_pol_3891.php (reporting on a poll conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California
and the Hewlett, Irvine, and Packard Foundations).
167. Koppelman, Phyllis Schlafly, supra note 88, at 124. R
168. Vandenbergh, supra note 156, at 1104–06. R
169. COMM’N ON CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS 39 (Oct. 20, 2000)
[hereinafter COPA REPORT], available at http://www.copacommission.org/report/
COPAreport.pdf.
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and the effects of Internet pornography.170  The government may play
a role in encouraging voluntary actions by funding programs that, for
example, “protect students against . . . unwanted exposure to inappro-
priate material.”171  Even China purports to encourage voluntary ac-
tion against pornography.  In 2005, Chinese Internet providers made
a public pledge to “[r]efrain[ ] from producing, posting or dissemi-
nating . . . obscenity.”172  There is some evidence that such programs
can reduce exposure to Internet pornography.  For example, the re-
ceipt of 100,000 e-mail complaints persuaded Yahoo to remove por-
nography from its video store within days after it had first offered it
for sale.173
The government’s own speech can play a central role in the crea-
tion of these antipollution norms.  Sometimes, however, the govern-
ment’s speech is itself the problem.  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition,174 the Supreme Court struck down the Child Pornography
Prevention Act’s (“CPPA”) prohibition on any visual depictions of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.175  The Congress that en-
acted CPPA provided detailed findings concerning the evils of child
pornography.176  Justice Kennedy, by contrast, wrote of the virtues of
movies such as Romeo & Juliet, Traffic, and American Beauty, offering an
account of the plot of each and explaining the important role that
child sexuality played in each.177  Those three movies had each re-
ceived critical praise (including nine Academy Awards and five nomi-
nations), but they had also been characterized as cultural pollution
during the public debate in the aftermath of the Columbine massa-
170. See Dan Gray, Talking to Youth About Pornography, CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LAT-
TER-DAY SAINTS, http://combatingpornography.org/cp/eng/parents/prevent/article/
talking-to-youth-about-pornography (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) (“As parents and priest-
hood leaders speak openly with youth about intimacy, they will be able to help them under-
stand and avoid the spiritual, emotional, and physical dangers of pornography.”).
171. Student Internet Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 780, 111th Cong. § 2(2).
172. Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry, IN-
TERNET SOC’Y OF CHINA (Jan. 25, 2005, 3:40 PM), http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca2788
81.htm.
173. See Saul Hansell, After Complaints, Yahoo to Close Access to Pornographic Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at C1 (reporting that “Yahoo will remove a wide range of porno-
graphic material from its site and make other such information harder to find”).
174. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
175. Id. at 257–58.
176. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623 (describing the “effect of the intrastate production, transporta-
tion, distribution, receipt, advertising, and possession of child pornography on the inter-
state market in child pornography”).
177. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 247–48 (describing the movies Romeo and Juliet,
Traffic, and American Beauty as having been inspired by “teenage sexual activity and the
sexual abuse of children”).
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cre.178  Whatever the merits of those movies, the congressional find-
ings of the horrors of child pornography received only passing
mention in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.179  The effect, intentional or
not, is to suggest that the Supreme Court cares more about the find-
ings of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences than those of
the U.S. Congress.  This is not just a complaint about unnecessary
dicta filling the pages of the United States Reports.  Precisely because the
First Amendment limits government regulation of speech, the alterna-
tive means of addressing the harms of such speech take on added im-
portance.  Perhaps the government cannot stop the harms associated
with the child pornography at issue in Free Speech Coalition or with the
Internet pornography discussed here, but the government can cer-
tainly discourage it instead of encouraging it.
The voluntary discontinuance of Internet pornography confronts
the same difficulties as the voluntary elimination of air or water pollu-
tion.  Pollution pays, preventing pollution is costly, and those benefits
will neither be surrendered nor will those costs be incurred without
some coercion.  Regardless of the good intentions of polluters or the
pressure of concerned parties, reliance upon voluntary efforts to re-
duce pollution often fails.180  It is a mistake, therefore, to present vol-
untary actions and legal regulation as mutually exclusive alternatives
to addressing Internet pornography.  This dichotomy, however, ap-
pears in the statements of judges—including Justice Stevens—who
emphasize the distinction between their roles as judges and as par-
178. See generally Jason Kovar, Columbine Effect, HOLLYWOOD UNMASKED, http://www.hol-
lywoodunmasked.com/columbineeffect.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2011) (commenting on
“The Columbine Effect” and the “gross effects of the nonstop and influential media”).
179. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244–45 (“In its legislative findings, Congress
recognized that there are subcultures of persons who harbor illicit desires for children and
commit criminal acts to gratify the impulses.  Congress also found that surrounding the
serious offenders are those who flirt with these impulses and trade pictures and written
accounts of sexual activity with young children.” (citations omitted)).
180. Scott Dewey has recorded many of these failures in the battle against air pollution.
See generally SCOTT HAMILTON DEWEY, DON’T BREATHE THE AIR: AIR POLLUTION AND U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 1945–1970 (2000).  The establishment of the first air pollution
control district in Los Angeles County occurred “only after the observed failure of efforts
to gain voluntary cooperation from pollution sources and incorporated cities.” Id. at 42.
New York City apartment owners ignored the pleas of the city’s commissioner of air pollu-
tion control to operate their incinerators only during appointed hours, leading Dewey to
conclude that the commissioner “had stubbornly failed to learn . . . a lesson control agen-
cies throughout the nation took forever to learn: that scientific research and persuasion
alone brought few if any results.” Id. at 127–29.  Florida’s Governor Leroy Collins advised
concerned citizen to “approach the phosphate industry about sharing the cost of uncover-
ing the facts about air pollution,” even though “such naive faith in the conscientiousness
and magnanimity of corporate America in voluntarily shouldering costs of environmental
cleanup would often prove misplaced.” Id. at 187.
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ents.181  Congress thought differently when it enacted COPA, finding
that “parental control protections and self-regulation . . . have not
provided a national solution to the problem of minors accessing
harmful material on the World Wide Web,” apparently because “the
widespread availability of the Internet presents opportunities for mi-
nors to access materials through the World Wide Web in a manner
that can frustrate parental supervision or control.”182  Likewise, Chief
Justice Burger wrote on the inadequacy of self-regulation,
Nor do modern societies leave disposal of garbage and sew-
age up to the individual “free will,” but impose regulation to
protect both public health and the appearance of public
places.  States are told by some that they must await a “laissez-
faire” market solution to the obscenity-pornography prob-
lem, paradoxically “by people who have never otherwise had
a kind word to say for laissez-faire,” particularly in solving . . .
environmental pollution problems.183
These failures of voluntary pollution control are predictable, for vol-
untary decisions involve financial sacrifices.  Polluting can be lucra-
tive, and many polluters are unwilling to forego that lucre voluntarily.
In sum, voluntary efforts to reduce or eliminate pollution are
worthy of societal praise and the law’s encouragement.  In the words
of proposed federal environmental audit legislation, “[I]t is in the in-
terest of the United States to promote voluntary efforts to maximize
compliance with environmental laws and to increase protection of the
environment and public health.”184  Cass Sunstein wrote that volun-
tary self-regulation “is emerging as a regulatory strategy of choice” be-
cause it offers industry more flexibility and protects the government
from informational overload.185  Reliance upon voluntary pollution
control efforts also allows private individuals and organizations to
make their own determinations of what constitutes pollution.  Volun-
tary actions are especially important when the law cannot or will not
intervene.  An undeniable point, however, exists where voluntary ef-
181. Compare Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (dis-
tinguishing what he would do “[a]s a parent, grandparent, and great-grandparent” and
“[a]s a judge”), with PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2004) (Davis,
Dist. J., concurring) (distinguishing “my proper role as judge” from the role of “the doting
grandfather that I am proud to be”).
182. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402, 112 Stat. 2681-736, 2681-736 (1998) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231 note (2006)).
183. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (citing IRVING KRISTOL, ON
THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 37 (1972)).
184. Environmental Protection Partnership Act, S. 1661, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (1999).
185. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L REV. 499, 551–52
(2000).
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forts become insufficient.  Educational campaigns and parental super-
vision are key strategies in addressing the effects of Internet
pornography on children.186  Even so, it is no more likely that such
voluntary actions or social norms will solve the problem of Internet
pornography than it is that those strategies would have remedied the
air and water pollution that ultimately inspired Congress to enact the
CAA and the CWA.
B. Technology
Technology is both the genesis of and the solution to many pollu-
tion problems.  The technology that fueled the industrial revolution
resulted in unprecedented air pollution in cities such as London,
Pittsburgh, and St. Louis.187  Cars and other motor vehicles produced
the smog that engulfed Los Angeles by the middle of the twentieth
century.188  Congress viewed technology as the solution to environ-
mental pollution when it enacted the CAA and the CWA.  The CAA
mandates that industries and businesses must satisfy various techno-
logical standards.189  The CWA dictates the specific technology that a
facility in a particular business must employ.190
Often the necessary pollution control technology does not exist
when an environmental regulation becomes effective.  The CAA and
the CWA seek to force the development of new pollution reducing
technologies.191  Technology-forcing laws require pollution reduc-
tions that cannot be achieved with existing technologies, thereby re-
quiring technological innovation.192  The use of such technology-
186. Martha McCarthy, The Continuing Saga of Internet Censorship: The Child Online Protec-
tion Act, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 92–93, 101.
187. See generally Jeffrey K. Stine & Joel A. Tarr, At the Intersection of Histories: Technology
and the Environment, 39 TECH. & CULTURE 601 (1998) (describing the effects of technology
on the environment).
188. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–12 (2006).
189. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (2006).
190. See id. (describing the requirement that regulated facilities employ “the best practi-
cable control technology”).
191. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (concluding that the CAA was
“expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that
might at the time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible”); see also Whit-
man v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 490–93 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (reviewing the technology-forcing aspects of the CAA).
192. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.)
(concluding that the CWA’s “statutory directive requiring facilities to adopt the best tech-
nology cannot be construed to permit a facility to take measures that produce second-best
results, especially given the technology-forcing imperative behind the Act” (citation omit-
ted)), rev’d sub nom.  Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009); Kennecott
Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 476 F.3d 946, 957 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“When a statute is technology-forcing, the agency ‘can impose a standard which
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forcing requirements has helped to achieve the statutory air and water
quality goals.  Recent laws (such as the CAA’s cap-and-trade scheme
for utilities whose emissions produce acid rain) give more flexibility to
individual facilities to determine which technology will best achieve
the required pollution reductions.193  Most recently, environmental
activists Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger argue that ordi-
nary environmental pollution regulations are misplaced in the case of
climate change, and that climate change is best approached by mas-
sive investments in new energy technologies.194
Technology is a bane and a curse for pornography.  Adler cites
“technological innovation” as “the most prominent factor” that
yielded “the mainstreaming of porn.”195  Another writer suggests that
the relationship is reciprocal, that pornography is actually “a positive
good that encourages experimentation with new media” and thus
helped to facilitate the development of printing, photography, televi-
sion, and videotaping before it reached the Internet.196  From this
perspective, the expansion of the Internet and the increased availabil-
ity of pornography go hand in hand.
Opponents of pornography also rely upon technological develop-
ments.  Software that filters unwanted pornographic material and ver-
ification technology that limits access to permitted (usually adult)
users have played a significant role in efforts to limit exposure to por-
nography.  Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes wrote that “technology in
this area has improved enormously” in the past five years, and they
accurately predicted that “it will only continue to improve in response
to demands from parents, governments, and especially businesses.”197
only the most technologically advanced plants in an industry have been able to achieve—
even if only in some of their operations some of the time’” (quoting United Steelworks v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
193. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–51o (outlining the CAA acid rain cap-and-trade program); see
also American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (proposing
to establish a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases).
194. See TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH
OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY (2007), available at http://www.
thebreakthrough.org/PDF/death_of_Environmentalism.pdf; TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL
SHELLENBERGER, THE EMERGING CLIMATE CONSENSUS: GLOBAL WARMING POLICY IN A POST-
ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD (2009), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org/blog/PDF/
EmergingClimateConsensus.pdf.
195. Adler, supra note 4, at 696. R
196. Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not to Censor the Internet, in POR-
NOGRAPHY: PRIVATE RIGHT OR PUBLIC MENACE 81 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum
eds., rev ed. 1998).
197. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14, at 816. R
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More generally, Jay Kesan and Rajiv Shah analyze the role of tech-
nology forcing on the Internet.198  They admit that “setting optimal
technology-forcing standards is difficult” because of “[t]he unpredict-
ability of technological advances.”199  Additionally, they emphasize
that “[t]he government must also have a clear understanding of the
harm it is trying to prevent or the benefit it is trying to produce when
it sets technology-forcing standards.”200 The government needs clarity
in order to enact the proper regulations to remedy the desired
harm.201  Kesan and Shah cite “numerous examples of code-based
technology-forcing regulation: filtering software, closed captioning,
the V-chip, accessibility, enhanced 911, and digital broadcasting.”202
The authors also explain why the CDA failed:
Congress ignored market-based incentives, instead institut-
ing an inefficient technology-forcing regulation.  The availa-
bility of existing technologies that prevented minors from
accessing inappropriate content, such as filtering products,
could also have provided an alternative approach.  The CDA
could have been designed to foster the efficient and expedi-
ent diffusion of these existing technologies, an approach
likely to have been even more efficient than a market-based
approach.  Instead, the CDA led to the development of new
technologies such as PICS [Platform for Internet Content Se-
lection], which has not solved the problem of minors gain-
ing access to inappropriate content.  Thus, the CDA can be
seen as a failed opportunity to leverage the efficiency of the
technology-forcing approach in diffusing existing
technologies.203
By contrast, successful technological limitations on Internet use often
prompt a backlash from individuals who are prevented from accessing
their favorite websites and from privacy advocates who promote a free
online environment.  The challenge is to identify technologies that
satisfy those who desire pornography on the Internet and those who
oppose it, which returns the discussion to the contested state of the
affected environment.
This is a greater challenge with respect to controlling pornogra-
phy than it is for controlling environmental pollution.  Unlike envi-
ronmental pollution, Internet pornography generates technology
198. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319 (2005).
199. Id. at 335.
200. Id. at 336.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 338 (footnotes omitted).
203. Id. at 339.
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races in which efforts to restrict pornography compete with efforts to
defeat those restrictions.204  Also unlike environmental pollution, the
First Amendment constrains the government’s ability to impose tech-
nological mandates.  The result is a complicated technological land-
scape that began with the efforts of American libraries to regulate
pornography in order to receive federal funds.205  Governments in
Iran and China then hijacked the technology to regulate the Internet
for their own purposes, which prompted the Falun Gong206 to de-
velop methods to avoid the controls.207  Iranian dissidents used these
anticontrol technologies to protest the announced results of the coun-
try’s June 2009 election.208
C. Separation
A typical response to concerns about pornography is to simply
avoid it.  More precisely, concerned individuals are instructed to avert
their eyes, turn the channel, or click on something else.  This advice is
foreign to discussions of environmental pollution, which expect the
polluter, instead of the victim, to move.  Here, I consider the appro-
priate placement of the burden of avoiding the harms of pornography
and review the roles of the leading separation strategies of filtering
and zoning.
1. The Burden of Avoidance
Regulation is addressed to polluters while toleration is addressed
to victims, but polluters and victims both have the ability to render
pollution harmless.  The initial question facing the choice of these
techniques asks whether the law should expect the polluter to stop
harming the victims, or whether the victims should be responsible for
avoiding the harms caused by the pollution.  This is the issue ad-
dressed in one of the most famous scholarly discussions of pollution:
Ronald Coase’s theorem questioning any presumption concerning
204. See Eli Lake, Hacking the Regime: How the Falun Gong Empowered the Iranian Uprising,
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 3, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/hacking-
the-regime (describing the competition between the Chinese government and organiza-
tions seeking to outwit Chinese filtering tools).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 259–61. R
206. THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33437, CHINA AND FALUN GONG 2 (May
25, 2006), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67820.pdf (noting
that Falun Gong is a belief system in China that “combines an exercise regimen with medi-
tation, moral values, spiritual beliefs, and faith” and that the Chinese government charges
“that the Falun Dafa [Falun Gong] has disrupted social order and contributed to the
deaths of hundreds”).
207. See Lake, supra note 204. R
208. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 36 22-JUN-11 14:53
974 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:939
the identity of the harmed party.209  The very example with which
Coase begins his article concerns a factory that emits smoke that
harms its neighbors.210  In popular discourse, the factory is the pol-
luter, and the neighbors are the victims.211  But Coase sees the prob-
lem as reciprocal: “To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.
The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to
harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?”212  Moving from air pollu-
tion to water pollution that kills fish, Coase asks whether “the value of
the fish lost [is] greater or less than the value of the product which
the contamination of the stream makes possible.”213  Indeed, Coase’s
formulation encompasses every conceivable instance of pollution: a
noisy hotel that keeps neighbors from sleeping, an employee whose
racist comments offend his co-workers, video game aficionados en-
joying a violent game in the lobby of a restaurant, and residents of a
once pastoral community complaining about the sprawl that brings an
influx of unwanted newcomers.214  The appellation “pollution” con-
notes that the wrongdoer and the victim are readily identified, but
Coase’s theorem insists otherwise.
The policy question for Coase and for the generation of econo-
mists and law and economics scholars whom he has inspired is how
the law should help the competing parties resolve their dispute.  My
concern here is simply with Coase’s initial assertion that every instance
of harm resulting from pollution is reciprocal.215  Coase has correctly
identified one sense in which that is so: a factory can object to being
harmed if its operations are constrained because neighboring re-
sidents complain that their environment has been polluted by toxins
discharged from the factory.216  There is another sense that supports
the distinction between polluter and victim, and it is the sense that
follows from the very definition of pollution.  Recall my suggestion
that the essence of pollution is the introduction of a pollutant into an
environment.217  The factory that discharges toxins into the environ-
209. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1959, at 1.
210. Id. at 1.
211. Id. at 1–2.
212. Id. at 2. Coase’s own examples involve several things commonly described as pollu-
tion: noise, id. at 8–9; air pollution, id. at 1, 10–13, 41–42; and odors, id. at 26.
213. Id. at 2.
214. See, e.g., Nagle, Idea of Pollution, supra note 25, at 16–17, 20, 24, 53 (providing exam- R
ples of the following activities being described as pollution: noise, offensive language,
video games, and unwanted community members).
215. See Coase, supra note 209, at 2 (“We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal R
nature.”).
216. See id. at 1–2 (noting that it is not always desirable punish the polluter).
217. See supra text accompanying note 19. R
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ment is a polluter; the people living nearby are not.  My idea of pollu-
tion helps to explain the intuitive sense that the factory is the cause of
the harm rather than the neighboring residents.  The question re-
mains whether the burden to avoid this harm should be placed upon
the polluter or the residents.  This is the question Coase sought to
answer, and it is a question the law frequently addresses as well.  Not
surprisingly, the law offers different answers for different kinds of
pollution.
Generally, environmental law places the burden to eliminate the
harm on the polluter.  Consider Richmond Manufacturing Co. v. Atlantic
DeLaine Co.,218 an 1871 dispute between two textile producers along
the Woonasquatucket River in Rhode Island.219  Richmond com-
plained that it could not use the water from the river because of the
dyes and other pollutants that Atlantic discharged into the river less
than one mile upstream.220  The case presents a perfect illustration of
Coase’s reciprocal harms: to rule in favor of either company would
harm the business of the other.221  Each producer pointed to steps the
other could take to resolve the problem.222  Richmond wanted an in-
junction to prevent Atlantic from discharging pollutants into the
river.223  Atlantic countered that Richmond “might have protected
themselves from all injury by a properly constructed filter.”224  The
state supreme court had no trouble deciding the case, even though it
ruled nearly a century too early to have benefitted from the insights
offered by Coase.225  Atlantic was enjoined from further pollution be-
cause riparian owners do not have the right to pollute the water.226
Richmond, by contrast, was “under no obligation” to filter the water,
“and the respondents have no right to put them to the expense of
doing it.”227
218. 10 R.I. 106 (1871).
219. Id. at 108–09.
220. Id.
221. A holding in favor of Richmond would require Atlantic to shut down its $1.5 mil-
lion manufacturing facility and cost the community 800 jobs. Id. at 108–10.  A holding in
favor of Atlantic would require Richmond to close branches of its business or spend money
creating filtering systems to purify the stream water. Id.
222. See id. at 110 (noting Atlantic’s argument that Richmond could filter the water
prior to use and Richmond’s argument that Atlantic could stop polluting the stream).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 110 (noting that “[t]he principles of law which govern the case are well
settled”).
226. Id. at 111.
227. Id. at 110.
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To be sure, the victims of air, noise, and other kinds of environ-
mental or sensory pollution can purchase filters, install shields, or sim-
ply move away from it.  Historically, those who complained about
environmental pollution were sometimes told to move somewhere
else.  As early as 1905, an American Medical Association official spoke
in Cincinnati about “the inhabitants who have fled their homes, many
of them elegant and even palatial establishments, leaving them at a
great loss to the ravages of smoke.”228  Thousands of people moved
away from Los Angeles in the 1950s and 1960s to escape the air pollu-
tion, often heeding their doctors’ advice.229  By August 1968, “sixty
faculty members of the UCLA School of Medicine . . . distributed a
formal warning to the public stating that those able to move away
from the smoggiest areas of Los Angeles should do so immedi-
ately.”230  More recently, Congress instructed the EPA to relocate the
few remaining people of Treece, Kansas, after their town was ren-
dered uninhabitable by hazardous wastes.231  Sometimes the polluter
facilitates the removal of the victims instead of the pollution.  In 2002,
for instance, American Electric Power responded to local concerns
about air pollution from the utility’s power plant by purchasing the
homes of all 221 residents of Cheshire, Ohio, so the residents could
move elsewhere.232  Nor is it only people who flee from pollution: Fish
engage in the same response when they avoid thermal pollution sim-
ply by swimming away.233  Moving away is thus a traditional response
to pollution.  But environmental law does not force people to make
that choice.
Constitutional law does.  First Amendment cases are filled with
exhortations to offended parties to simply avert their eyes, turn off the
radio or television, or visit another website. Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville234 provides the best illustration.  In that case, people in a residen-
228. Charles A. L. Reed, An Address on the Smoke Problem, in CONSERVATION IN THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA: CLASSIC TEXTS 75 (David Stradling ed., 2004).
229. See Smog and Health, S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., http://www.aqmd.gov/
smog/historical/smog_and_health.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (citing a 1956 survey
sent by the Los Angeles County Medical Association to physicians that revealed 43.3% of
physicians had recommended patients move out of the area due to the smog).
230. See DEWEY, supra note 180, at 92, 105 (describing people fleeing Los Angeles). R
231. Act of Oct. 30, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 430, 123 Stat. 2904, 2964 (encouraging
the Administrator of the EPA to consider the residents of Treece, Kansas).
232. Katharine Q. Seelye, Utility Buys Town It Choked, Lock, Stock, and Blue Plume, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2002, at A1.
233. See FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., INDUSTRIAL WASTE GUIDE ON THERMAL
POLLUTION 29–30 (rev. ed. Sept. 1968) (reporting that some fish species would be elimi-
nated from areas of thermal pollution).
234. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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tial neighborhood complained that a local drive-in movie theater was
showing a pornographic movie that could be seen from their homes
and from the city streets.235  Recall that when a state court in Arizona
confronted a similar case in 1971, it enjoined the theater, pointedly
asking why cultural pollution should be accepted more than environ-
mental pollution.236  Most courts reached a similar conclusion in like
cases that had arisen in other states.237  In Erznoznik, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Jacksonville city ordinance because it singled out
exhibitions of nudity in violation of the First Amendment.238  The
Court held that “the burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid
further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his]
eyes.’”239  The only exception to that burden occurred if “the degree
of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to
avoid exposure.”240  The Court refused to force drive-in theaters to
“construct adequate protective fencing which may be extremely ex-
pensive or even physically impracticable.”241  In dissent, then-Chief
Justice Warren Burger would have imposed the burden upon the thea-
ter to shield the screen from public view.242  Chief Justice Burger
noted three points favoring his allocation of that burden: (1) “the
screen of a drive-in movie theater is a unique type of eye-catching dis-
play that can be highly intrusive and distracting”; (2) the screen could
not be turned off, unlike the radio; and (3) those interested in the
movie could see it at several indoor theaters in the area.243
The distinction between Richmond and Erznoznik could simply il-
lustrate Coase’s belief that the parties will reach the best solution.
The law, however, makes the parties start at the opposite points: envi-
ronmental law favors the victims of pollution, whereas most First
Amendment jurisprudence favors the polluters.  Which choice is pref-
erable will depend upon the nature of the pollution and the harms it
causes, an economic analysis of the costs that would be borne by ei-
ther party, the existence of any constitutional protections, and the na-
ture of the pollution technique to be employed.
235. Id. at 206–07.
236. See supra text accompanying note 5. R
237. See, e.g., People v. Valley Cinemas, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862–63 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (finding the factual record indistinguishable from Erznoznik), dismissed as moot, 211
Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1984).
238. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217–18.
239. Id. at 210–11 (alterations in original) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971)).
240. Id. at 209–10.
241. Id. at 217.
242. Id. at 222–23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 222.
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It is unreasonable to expect the victim of environmental pollu-
tion to move.  Such advice represents a failure of pollution control,
not an instance of it.  Economic and family constraints make such
moves impossible for many victims of pollution.  For example, re-
sidents of impoverished communities suffering from polluted water
and air cannot really escape that pollution.  Exit is not always a realis-
tic option for many victims of pollution, and even if it is, the law
should not presume that people will exercise it.
Nor should the law be so casual in assuming the ability of those
exposed to an environment polluted by violent entertainment or por-
nography to escape any harmful exposures.  One survey found that
eighty-four percent of boys and sixty percent of girls had been acci-
dentally exposed to sex sites on the Internet.244  Other surveys indi-
cate that the presence of Internet pornography keeps some people
offline altogether.245  Robert George rejects the idea that individuals
have the burden to avoid pornography because it is “unjust to subject
people to powerful temptations to do things that are harmful to them,
morally or otherwise.”246  Schauer observes that averting one’s eyes
does not necessarily prevent the infliction of harm because the
wounds from even a brief glance at an undesirable sight “linger in our
minds as long as (and sometimes longer than) the wounds produced
by physical intrusions.”247  The pollution analogy suggests that the es-
capist assumption of some First Amendment jurisprudence should be
revisited.
Finally, the burden of avoiding pollution may also depend upon
who is being harmed.  Children, for example, are uniquely susceptible
to environmental pollution because they spend more time outside,
they consume more food and water than adults relative to their body
mass, and children’s developing bodies are particularly sensitive to
pollution and less capable of rendering pollution harmless.248  Envi-
ronmental law, however, has little to teach pornography about pro-
244. See Michael Flood, Exposure to Pornography Among Youth in Australia, 43 J. SOCIOLOGY
45, 53 (2007).
245. See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE EVER-SHIFTING
INTERNET POPULATION: A NEW LOOK AT INTERNET ACCESS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 4, 16
(Apr. 16, 2003) (finding that larger than a third of those who do not use the Internet cited
worries “about online pornography, credit card theft, and fraud”).  The same study found
that only one percent of those surveyed cited pornography as a reason for dropping off the
Internet. Id. at 22.
246. George, supra note 15, at 18. R
247. Schauer, supra note 67, at 648. R
248. See generally The National Children’s Study Interagency Coordinating Comm., The
National Children’s Study of Environmental Effects on Child Health and Development, 111 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 642 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
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tecting children because environmental law has been slow to protect
them.249  By contrast, the law has been eager to protect children from
Internet pornography.  That is why Congress enacted COPA,250
CIPA,251 and numerous other provisions aimed at protecting children
from the harms of Internet pornography.252  Another bill would have
required schools to “protect students against . . . unwanted exposure
to inappropriate material.”253  Studies of Aboriginal children in Aus-
tralia tell an especially chilling story of the effects of repeated expo-
sure to pornography.254  Children are at greater risk to all sorts of
pollution,255 so the unwillingness to tolerate the effects of Internet
pornography upon children should come as no surprise.
2. Filtering
Filtering has become an especially common approach to the con-
cerns about Internet pornography.256  The goal of filtering software is
to block access to unwanted websites while allowing access to other
material.  Numerous companies produce filtering software designed
to screen online material that a consumer finds undesirable, espe-
cially sexually explicit websites.  Likewise, filtering has long played a
PMC1241458/ (discussing how children are more susceptible than adults to environmen-
tal pollution).
249. See generally J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1284–93 (2007) (describing environmental law’s efforts to
protect children).
250. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998).
251. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 276A-335 (2000).
252. See generally Fight Fraud Act of 2009, H.R. 1748, 111th Cong. § 3031(b)(3) (defin-
ing “high-tech crime” to include “cybercrime or computer crime, including internet-based
crime against children and child pornography”).
253. Student Internet Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 780, 111th Cong. § 2(2) (2009).
254. See generally E.P. MULLIGHAN, CHILDREN ON ANANGU PITJANTJATJARA
YANKUNYTJATJARA (APY) LANDS: COMMISSION OF INQUIRY—A REPORT INTO SEXUAL ABUSE, at
xxvi (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.papertracker.com.au/pdfs/Mullighan_Re-
port.pdf (recommending restrictions to access to pornographic materials by children and
recommending “education campaign[s] on the dangers of exposing children to pornogra-
phy”); NORTHERN TERRITORY GOV’T, AMPE AKELYERNEMANE MEKE MEKARLE “LITTLE CHIL-
DREN ARE SACRED”: REPORT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE
PROTECTION OF ABORIGINAL CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL ABUSE 32, 65 (2007), available at http:/
/www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/ (recommending community education campaigns on chil-
dren’s exposure to pornography).
255. The National Children’s Study Interagency Coordinating Comm., supra note 248. R
256. For the best discussions of the role of filtering in controlling Internet pornography,
see ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING (Ronald
Deibert et al. eds., 2008); COPA REPORT, supra note 169, at 19–22; NATIONAL RESEARCH R
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 58, at 267–304; Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. R
377 (2009); R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755 (1999);
Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997).
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role in environmental pollution control as businesses seek to dis-
charge wastes while preventing harmful materials from entering the
natural environment.257  Filtering depends, however, on an under-
standing of which materials are desirable and which are undesirable,
as well as on the engineering capacity to distinguish between the two
categories.  This is not an especially serious problem with environ-
mental pollution—except, for example, in the unlikely event that a
filter reduced the flow of water to a trickle in the process of screening
the harmful materials.  But, accurate Internet filtering presents real
problems because of the lack of consensus regarding the desirability
of certain materials, and because a particularly fine filter will block
access to websites that everyone agrees are valuable.258
The Supreme Court has championed filtering, even to the exclu-
sion of other techniques.  According to CIPA, any public library that
receives federal monies to provide Internet access must install and op-
erate filters that block obscenity and child pornography, and that
shield minors from material that would be harmful to them.259  The
American Library Association and other concerned groups objected
that the available filters were overinclusive, blocking medical and edu-
cational information that no one found objectionable.260  The Su-
preme Court rejected a facial challenge to the law as contrary to the
First Amendment, emphasizing that the law allowed the filters to be
disabled at the request of a patron.261  A similar attraction to filters
emerged from the Court’s 2004 decision invalidating COPA.262  The
doctrinal framework imposed by First Amendment jurisprudence
asked whether the means chosen by Congress to control harmful
speech was the least speech restrictive means available.263  Justice Ken-
nedy extolled filtering as less restrictive and more effective than the
verification screens relied upon by Congress in enacting COPA.264
257. See, e.g., INDUS. ENVTL. RESEARCH LAB., EPA, EPA-600/7-78-087, THIRD SYMPOSIUM
ON FABRIC FILTERS FOR PARTICULATE COLLECTION (June 1978) (compiling technical papers
presented at a 1977 symposium regarding research and technology for environmental
filtering).
258. See Bambauer, supra note 256 (noting that various countries differ considerably on R
what content should and should not be filtered out).
259. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 200–01, 207 n.3 (2003); see also 47
U.S.C. § 254(h) (2006) (noting that libraries must certify they have an Internet safety pol-
icy in place before receiving telecom discounts).
260. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206–08.
261. Id. at 209, 214.
262. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004).
263. Id. at 666–68.
264. Id. at 667–68 (noting that a person may escape conviction under COPA by restrict-
ing a minor’s access to certain content by requiring use of a credit card or by implement-
ing a digital certificate that verifies age).
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Justice Breyer, in dissent, criticized such heavy reliance upon filtering
because it “underblocks, imposes a cost upon each family that uses it,
fails to screen outside the home, and lacks precision.”265  Justice
Breyer also observed that COPA represented the congressional deter-
mination that “despite the availability of filtering software, children
were still being exposed to harmful material on the Internet.”266
Environmental law teaches that Justice Breyer is right.  Filters are
not the definitive solution to air or water pollution.  To cite one exam-
ple, the City of Honolulu once argued that a CWA lawsuit should be
dismissed as moot because the city had just installed a new filter at its
sewage treatment plant, but the court kept the case alive because “the
new filter is hardly the panacea the City claims it to be.”267  Filters,
moreover, are part of the traditional command-and-control approach
of environmental law, whereas second generation environmental
thought insists that “new approaches are needed to address remaining
and emerging environmental problems.”268  A preoccupation with any
one means of solving a perceived pollution problem further contra-
dicts the insights of second generation environmental law, which
posits that there is no single solution to any pollution problem.  This
experience with other pollution problems suggests that filters can play
a significant role in controlling Internet pornography, but perhaps
not the central role that the Court and some other proponents ex-
pect.  Justice Breyer’s insistence that there are no “magic solutions” to
Internet pornography echoes the lessons of environmental
pollution.269
3. Zoning
Zoning is another common response to pollution.  As with filter-
ing, zoning can be the result of voluntary action to separate polluting
activity from its victims, but most zoning is accomplished by law.  Many
local zoning laws require polluting facilities to be located in areas
away from residences, schools, and hospitals.270  Similarly, zoning is a
265. Id. at 686 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Presumably a similar concern arises when the
government prescribes a particular Internet filter, which is what sparked the outcry against
China’s Green Dam, see supra text accompanying notes 107–19, even though individuals R
could disable the filter if they chose to do so.
266. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 684. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267. Save Our Bays & Beaches v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1120 (D.
Haw. 1994).
268. Second Generation of Environmental Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 3448, 106th
Cong. § 2(1).
269. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
270. Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health, and Environmental Justice: What’s the Connection,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 575–76 (2002).
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common response to pornography.  Many local governments have en-
acted ordinances that specify where businesses selling or displaying
pornographic materials may or may not be located.271  The theory jus-
tifying the concentration of such enterprises is that pollution is best
limited to one place that concerned individuals may avoid;272 the the-
ory justifying the opposite approach of requiring such enterprises to
be spread throughout a city is that their effects will be diluted.273  The
Court has upheld such laws because they regulate the secondary ef-
fects of pornographic businesses, such as traffic and crime, so long as
a municipality affords sufficient alternative sites for those busi-
nesses.274  Koppelman understands the Court’s decisions “as an effort
to restrict the geographic scope of a certain kind of moral harm,”
which is precisely how local zoning laws seek to address environmental
pollution, albeit in response to different harms.275
The Supreme Court has been less accepting of federal laws seek-
ing to “zone” pornography on the Internet.  The Court held that both
the CDA and COPA violated the First Amendment.276  Both laws
sought to enforce a boundary between children and pornographic
websites, first by prohibiting the knowing transmission of material to
minors (in the CDA)277 and then by mandating age verification tools
to restrict access to those websites (in COPA).278  Indeed, Justice
O’Connor described the CDA as “little more than an attempt by Con-
gress to create ‘adult zones’ on the Internet.”279  But, the Supreme
Court held that the operative terms in the CDA were unconstitution-
ally vague, and then it held that the government had failed to show
271. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 252 (1990).
272. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 312
(2009) (noting that some members of the public, as consumers and homebuyers, want to
avoid adult entertainment areas).
273. Cf. id. (noting that “adult businesses” are prone to becoming high-crime districts
which may support the dilution approach, yet also noting members of the public, as con-
sumers and homebuyers, want to avoid such areas, supporting a cluster approach).
274. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54–55 (1986) (up-
holding an ordinance requiring the concentration of pornographic businesses); Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72–73 (1976) (upholding a Detroit ordinance
prohibiting the concentration of pornographic businesses).  For a perceptive and critical
view of these zoning decisions, see generally Fee, supra note 272. R
275. Koppelman, Moral Harm, supra note 11, at 1674. R
276. See Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Techni-
cal Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (1999) (discussing how the COPA and the CDA
were struck down).
277. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997).
278. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 662 (2004).
279. Reno, 521 U.S. at 886 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  For another outline of how a
federal statute could constitutionally employ a zoning response to Internet pornography,
see Lessig & Resnick, supra note 276. R
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that COPA employed the least speech restrictive approach to control-
ling Internet pornography.280  A similar problem arises in the cases
questioning whether an individual community is permitted to employ
its own standards to judge what pornographic materials are obscene
and thus beyond the protection of the First Amendment.281  The in-
ability to enforce boundaries between Internet pornography and
those whom it is said to injure thus eliminates a common and effective
tool for the control of many kinds of pollution.
Nor are the Supreme Court’s suggested alternatives likely to be as
effective.  In striking down COPA, the Court endorsed another fed-
eral statute that authorizes a “Dot Kids” domain containing material
suitable for children under the age of thirteen.282  Such a “Dot Kids”
domain relies upon zoning ideas, as does the converse proposal to
isolate all pornographic materials in a “Dot XXX” domain.  The the-
ory justifying the “Dot Kids” domain is that children will be more in-
terested in websites that are designed for them than in websites
featuring sexually explicit materials.283  Which websites will actually at-
tract more children is questionable, and the zoning fails if there are
no means of restricting minors from accessing the pornographic
materials.  The “Dot Kids” domain thus echoes the efforts to dilute
pollution.  The dilution of pornography was questioned as early as
1930, when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a
bookseller could not assume that children who read an obscene pas-
sage in a book “would continue to read on until the evil effects of the
obscene passages were weakened or dissipated with the tragic denoue-
ment of a tale.”284  In 1986, the Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography observed that “[m]any of these materials may present
the message in a more diluted form, but certainly their prevalence
more than compensates for any possible dilution.”285  Environmental
law learned this lesson long ago, and the aphorism that “dilution is
280. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 (upholding injunction against CDA); Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at
673 (affirming injunction against COPA).
281. Compare United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying a
local community standard in an online obscenity prosecution), and United States v. Harb,
No. 2:07-CR-426TS, 2009 WL 499467 (D. Utah Feb. 27, 2009) (applying the Miller v. Califor-
nia, “contemporary community standard” to deny a motion to dismiss an indictment of
federal obscenity statutes), with United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir.
2009) (applying a national standard).
282. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 663.
283. Id. (describing the “Dot Kids” domain provision of 47 U.S.C. § 941 (2006)); NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 58, at 335–39, 327–34 (examining the “Dot R
Kids” domain and considering a “Dot XXX” domain).
284. Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472, 474 (Mass. 1930).
285. ATTORNEY GENERAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 85, at 52. R
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the solution to pollution” only appears in environmental history
books, not in environmental statutes.286
VI. CONCLUSION
Andrew Koppelman laments that “[m]ost of the serious discus-
sions about the moral import of pornography take place in the con-
text of proposals to criminalize it.  Criminalizing pornography is a
mistake.  But discussion of pornography’s moral import is urgently
needed.”287  Environmental law is familiar with discussions of pollu-
tion, a term that derived from a sense of moral defilement.288  Our
experience addressing environmental pollution also identifies a broad
middle ground between enforcing criminal prohibitions and relying
upon moral condemnation.  As with environmental pollution, there is
no single solution to the problems presented by pornography.  One
response should be a continued discussion about how pornography
affects those who are exposed to it as well as the broader cultural envi-
ronment.  Additionally, the law should facilitate efforts by concerned
individuals to avoid such exposure—perhaps by encouraging filtering
or zoning strategies—even though such efforts might require a re-
thinking of some First Amendment jurisprudence that expects the vic-
tims of pornography to avoid its harms.  The most difficult task for the
law is to identify how to address the claims of cultural pollution associ-
ated with pornography, but again, environmental law is likely to be
instructive in this effort as well.
286. See N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts:  The
Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 643 (1977) (admitting that
“[t]he idea of reducing pollution by spreading out discharge sources to take fuller advan-
tage of the assimilative capacity of existing areas of high ambient air and water quality
seems eminently sensible,” but asserting that “‘[d]ilution is not the solution to
pollution’”).
287. Koppelman, Phyllis Schlafly, supra note 88, at 124. R
288. See Nagle, Idea of Pollution, supra note 25, at 6–15 (explaining the etymology of R
“pollution”).
